Long-run Consequences of Ranking Job Applicants by Unemployment Duration: Theoretical and Numerical Analyses by Kitagawa  Akiomi
Long-run Consequences of Ranking Job
Applicants by Unemployment Duration:
Theoretical and Numerical Analyses
著者 Kitagawa  Akiomi
journal or
publication title
DSSR Discussion Papers
number 13
page range 1-60
year 2013-08-28
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10097/64990
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Data Science and Service Research 
Discussion Paper  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion Paper No. 13 
Long-run Consequences of Ranking Job Applicants 
by Unemployment Duration: Theoretical and 
Numerical Analyses 
 
Akiomi KITAGAWA 
August 28, 2013 
Center for Data Science and Service Research 
Graduate School of Economic and Management 
Tohoku University 
27-1 Kawauchi, Aobaku 
Sendai 980-8576, JAPAN 
 
Long-run Consequences of Ranking Job Applicants
by Unemployment Duration: Theoretical and
Numerical Analyses
Akiomi KITAGAWA
August 28, 2013
Abstract
This paper considers the long-run consequences of ranking job ap-
plicants on the basis of their unemployment durations by using a
general equilibrium model in which statistical discrimination by rms
against jobless workers may yield multiple stationary equilibria. Be-
cause the most inecient equilibrium is supported by the belief that
jobless workers have lost their employability, the government should
dissuade rms from holding this extreme belief, thereby creating sec-
ond chances for jobless workers. Moreover, by reducing the incomes
of jobless workers through taxation, the government can create a new
equilibrium in which job seekers can nd new jobs without experiencing
long-term unemployment.
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1 Introduction
Long-term unemployment has become one of the biggest problems facing
developed economies. While details dier from one economy to another,
there is one common feature found in all economies: the longer a worker is
unemployed, the more dicult it becomes for him or her to nd a job. There
has been controversy over the cause of this phenomenon for more than three
decades.1 One group of researchers argue that the long-term unemployed
cannot nd a job simply because they are no longer employable. This ar-
gument is based on two presumptions. First, jobless workers gradually lose
their employability as their unemployment duration becomes longer. Sec-
ond, at job interviews, employers detect and reject job applicants who have
lost their employability. It is self-evident that these presumptions jointly
produce the above-mentioned observation. A second group of researchers
does not accept this explanation, arguing that the long-term unemployed
cannot nd a job because employers \rank" job applicants by their un-
employment durations and tend to hire those with shorter unemployment
durations without checking whether they are really employable or not. Fol-
lowing their explanation, such a discriminatory practice, which Blanchard
and Diamond (1994) call \ranking," makes it dicult for the long-term un-
employed to nd jobs, which produces the observed duration dependence.
Tautological as it may sound, a worker is long-term unemployed because he
or she is long-term unemployed.
Recently, a number of empirical and experimental studies have presented
evidence that supports the second view. For example, Eriksson and Lager-
strom (2006, 2012) use an Internet-based CV database in Sweden to in-
vestigate empirically whether being unemployed reduces the probability of
getting contacted by rms. Because all workers looking for new jobs are
invited to submit their personal details to this database, the authors have
access to exactly the same information as the rms, and they nd that an
unemployed applicant faces a lower contact probability than an otherwise
identical employed applicant. Eriksson and Rooth (2011) use unique data
from a eld experiment in the Swedish labor market to investigate how past
and contemporary unemployment aect a young worker's probability of be-
ing invited to a job interview; they nd evidence that recruiting employers
use not past but contemporary unemployment to sort workers. While these
studies emphasize that being unemployed reduces the probability of getting
contacted by rms, Oberholzer-Gee (2008), in a eld experiment in Switzer-
land, documents that job market opportunities for unemployed workers di-
minish rapidly over time. According to this experiment, a person who has
been without a job for 2.5 years is 51 percent less likely to be invited to an
interview than an employed person. After 30 months, it makes little sense
1See Machin and Manning (1999) for a survey.
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for an individual to keep applying for jobs because few rms will express an
interest in hiring this person. The results of these studies strongly suggest
that ranking is a common practice in the actual labor market.2
This paper considers the long-run consequences of ranking job applicants
by their unemployment durations in the framework of a simple general equi-
librium model with the following features. First, unemployment arises from
the problem of nonveriability rooted in the employer{employee relation-
ship. Specically, the model assumes not only that employers can only
imperfectly observe the work eorts of their employees, as assumed in the
model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), but also that the work eort of any
worker is unveriable to third parties, including the law court. As argued
by MacLeod and Malcomson (1989), when the work eort is unveriable,
backloading wage payment systems, such as performance pay, are ineec-
tive in eliciting workers' eort because such a system gives employers an
incentive to evade wage payment by asserting that the employee has not
expended work eorts. This, in turn, induces the workers hired by an em-
ployer with that system to shirk in response to the prospective nonpayment
of wages. To avoid such an unproductive situation, employers choose to
adopt a non-backloading wage payment system as considered by Shapiro and
Stiglitz, which leaves some workers in the jobless state. Second, statistical
discrimination against the long-term unemployed arises from informational
asymmetry between employers and jobless workers. The model assumes not
only that employers can only imperfectly observe the employability of job
candidates, but also that the employability of any worker is unveriable to
third parties. Under these assumptions, employers' beliefs about the em-
ployability of jobless workers can inuence labor market performance based
on the theory of statistical discrimination pioneered by Phelps (1972) and
Arrow (1973). Specically, employers believe that jobless workers who have
been unemployed for at least a given length of time are not employable, and
they set an admissible length of unemployment duration to qualify them for
employment. Jobless workers, on the other hand, decide whether or not to
preserve their employability, given such a ranking behavior and the wages
they will receive after being rehired. This interaction between employers
and jobless workers potentially gives rise to multiple stationary equilibria,
2In addition, it is worth mentioning the study by Ghayad and Dickens (2012) and a
follow-up experiment performed by Ghayad. Their study shows that since June 2009, the
Beveridge curve in the United States, which normally exhibits a downward relationship
between job openings and unemployment, has broken down for the long-term unemployed
in such a manner that a rising number of job openings does not reduce the number of
the long-term unemployed. This implies the possibility that employers rank the long-
term unemployed lower than other potential candidates. To test this possibility, Ghayad
performs an experiment in which he sends out resumes describing the qualications and
employment history of 4,800 ctitious workers and nds that those who reported having
been unemployed for six months or more received very few callbacks even when their
qualications were better than those of the workers who attracted employers' interest.
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each of which supports a distinct belief of employers. Third, the number
of employers is endogenously determined by free entry, which makes it pos-
sible to explore the implications of increased entry costs for labor market
performance and allocative eciency. As the entry cost takes a larger value,
employers are forced to pay lower wages to their employees to keep invest-
ments in their rms protable. When the entry cost is larger than a critical
level, wages become too low to motivate employed workers, unless unem-
ployment duration before nding a new job is expected to be suciently
long. This necessitates a large scale of unemployment, which creates room
for employers' belief to play a crucial role in selecting job applicants.
Theoretical and numerical analyses show that the number of stationary
equilibria varies with the entry cost. When the entry cost is smaller than
the above-mentioned critical level, there are two stationary equilibria in this
model. In one of them, which we call the \no-second-chance equilibrium,"
or NSCE, employers believe that all jobless workers have lost their employ-
ability, and they ll their vacancies exclusively with new entrants into the
labor force, who are employable by assumption. This hiring policy discour-
ages jobless workers from maintaining their employability since it completely
destroys their chances of being rehired. In the other equilibrium, which we
call the \second-chance equilibrium," or SCE, employers believe that some
jobless workers, whose unemployment durations do not exceed a given pos-
itive length of time, are still employable, and they ll their vacancies not
only with new entrants, but also with the jobless workers who are qualied
for employment. This eectively assures all jobless workers of nding a new
job after experiencing one period of unemployment as long as they are em-
ployable, and thus, they choose to maintain their employability. Because
the SCE facilitates rapid access by the unemployed to jobs, and because its
allocation is far more ecient than that of the NSCE, the government in
this case should guide the economy to the SCE by persuading employers to
abandon the extreme belief that all jobless workers are unemployable. When
the entry cost is larger than the above-mentioned critical level but smaller
than another level, there are multiple SCEs and one NSCE in this model,
although the number of SCEs decreases as the entry cost takes a larger
value. Again, in this case, the NSCE is vastly inferior to the SCEs in em-
ployment and allocative eciency. Thus, the government should persuade
employers not to hold the belief that all jobless workers are unemployable,
thereby preventing the realization of the NSCE. In addition, none of the
existing SCEs attains the maximal level of employment, which implies that
in those equilibria, jobless workers must experience more than one period of
unemployment to nd a new job. This malfunction of the labor market can
be improved if the government can reduce the incomes of jobless workers
by taxation. This policy coalesces the existing SCEs into a single SCE that
attains the maximal level of employment, which works in favor of not only
workers but also investors with stakes in rms operated by employers. When
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the entry cost is larger than the second critical level, there is no stationary
equilibrium but a single NSCE in this model. In that equilibrium, no pro-
duction occurs because wages that can motivate employed workers are too
high for investors in a new rm to make a prot or break even, and thus,
there is no labor demand in the economy. Again, in this case, the policy
of reducing the incomes of jobless workers is eective in restoring produc-
tion activities, as it creates one NSCE and one SCE, both of which attain
a positive level of employment; the latter, in fact, attains its maximal level.
However, this does not lead to an improvement in economic welfare since
it brings a substantial welfare loss to workers (although it always makes
investors better o). In this case, taxing jobless workers eectively curtails
their income-earning opportunities other than employment, thereby forcing
them to work for low wages.
The idea that the prolonged unemployment of some workers results from
employers' discriminatory treatment of job applicants based on their ob-
servable record of unemployment has been formalized by Lockwood (1991),
Blanchard and Diamond (1994), Acemoglu (1995), Kubler and Weizsacker
(2003), Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004), Eriksson and Gottfries (2005), and
Eriksson (2006). Among these theoretical works, that of Acemoglu is most
closely related to this paper, as he also uses statistical discrimination to
explain long-term unemployment. Unlike in the model of this paper, un-
employment occurs as a result of a mismatch in his model, but the models
have two common assumptions. First, jobless workers have to incur a cost
to maintain their skills (or employability). Second, in the current model,
employers can only imperfectly observe whether the jobless workers have
done so, whereas in Acemoglu's model, once employment begins, employers
can perfectly observe whether their newly-recruited employees have skills.
These assumptions jointly produce multiple equilibria, in one of which em-
ployers discriminate against the long-term unemployed, who, in response,
allow their skills to atrophy. When the cost to maintain skills is suciently
small and employers can fairly precisely observe whether the unemployed
have incurred that cost, Acemoglu's model also has an equilibrium in which
employers do not discriminate against the long-term unemployed, who, in
response, decide to maintain their skills. As stated above, similar results are
obtained in this paper, which is a natural result based on the assumptions
that both models have in common.
Pioneering as it is, Acemoglu's analysis has several issues. First of all, it
is not suciently detailed to explore the full implications of his model. For
analytical simplicity, he has assumed that matching probabilities are con-
stant, which markedly limits the scope of his model and possibly conceals
some implications that would be evident if these probabilities were endoge-
nized, especially those of entrepreneurial environments for employment. A
more detailed analysis is needed, as the importance of entrepreneurship for
job creation is now widely recognized. In addition, a well-known criticism
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against the theory of statistical discrimination is true of his model. Since,
in his model, employers can perfectly observe whether their employees have
skills after employment has begun, discrimination against the long-term un-
employed is eliminated if employers adopt an employment system in which
higher wages and tenure are given to the workers who have skills at the stage
of non-tenured employment. In other words, the occurrence of discrimina-
tion in his model depends crucially on the assumption that labor contracts
must be written before the employability of a job applicant becomes clear.
To advance the theory of long-term unemployment one step further in
the direction indicated by Acemoglu, this paper extends the eciency wage
model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) into a general equilibrium framework
in which the number of employers is endogenously determined by free entry,
thereby exploring the implications of entry costs for labor market perfor-
mance and allocative eciency. To avoid the criticism against the theory of
statistical discrimination, the model assumes that employers can only imper-
fectly observe the employability of job candidates and that the employability
of any worker is unveriable to third parties, including the law court, as al-
ready stated. Under these assumptions, employers are reluctant to adopt
the above-mentioned tenure-track system because the job openings of those
who have adopted it are likely to be avoided by job applicants, who deeply
suspect that those employers have an incentive to exploit that nonveriabil-
ity, ring their employees at the end of the non-tenured employment stage
under the pretense that they have turned out to be unemployable, thereby
avoiding the payment of higher wages. To dispel this suspicion, employers
need to enter into contracts with workers before their employability becomes
clear by screening job applicants based on their employment records before
interviews.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. Section 3 considers the labor contract between the employer and
the worker under the assumed informational frictions, and then derives the
prole of the aggregate labor demand. Section 4 derives proles of the
\aggregate incentive constraints," which provide the wage level employers
would choose given the aggregate employment, although they are dened
only when those wages are high enough to motivate the jobless workers
whom employers believe to be employable to preserve their employability.
Section 5 derives the stationary equilibria numerically and examines their
welfare properties to obtain some policy implications. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
The analysis is based on a simple dynamic general equilibrium model with
eciency wages a la Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). Time is discrete, extending
from negative innity to positive innity.
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2.1 Workers
At the beginning of each period, a continuum of workers of measure [=(1 
)]N is born, where  and N are constants satisfying  2 (0; 1) and N > 0.
Workers are mortal: they die in a given period with a probability , and
therefore, their probability of surviving into the next period is 1   . This
shock is idiosyncratic, and thus, the population of workers born s period
prior decreases to (1   )s 1N at the beginning of the current period. In
the rst period of their lives, workers neither work nor consume, but devote
the period to job search activities. Because they do not work until the second
period of their lives, the population of the labor force in a given period, that
is, the total number of workers who can work in that period, is
1X
s=1
(1  )s 1N = N:
The constant population of the labor force is attained in such a manner that
at the beginning of each period, the old workers of measure N die and exit
the labor force and, as a substitute, the same measure of new workers, who
were born in the previous period, enter it.3
The lifetime utility of a worker born in a generic period t is given by
Et
1X
s=1

1  
1 + r
s
(It+s   et+s)
where Et, r, It+s, and et+s represent, respectively, the conditional expecta-
tion evaluated at the beginning of period t, the discount rate that is positive
and constant over time, the real income earned in period t + s, and the
eort level chosen in that period. After entry into the labor force, a worker
is either employed by a rm or unemployed in any period. She is paid wages
by her rm when employed and endowed with some xed amount (w units)
of the consumption good when unemployed.4 Thus, It+s can be written as
It+s =

wt+s if employed in period t+ s
w otherwise;
where wt+s denotes the real wage received in period t+ s.
In each period, the worker sets the level of eort at either zero or a xed
positive, denoted by e, which aects her employer's production when em-
ployed and her own employability when unemployed. An employed worker
contributes to her employer's production if and only if she is employable
3For any generation of workers, by assumption, those of measure [2=(1   )]N die
before entering the labor force.
4This unemployment allows for workers that are self-employed or in low-paid jobs in
the secondary labor market.
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and expends e units of work eort. Every worker is employable when en-
tering the labor force and costlessly maintains this ability during periods of
employment. During periods of unemployment, in contrast, a worker must
expend e units of eort in every period to maintain her employability. If she
neglects this maintenance even in one period, her employability is lost and
never restored.
2.2 Firms and Investors
In this economy, rms are also mortal: in every period, new rms are estab-
lished, while some of the existing ones disappear.
Establishing a new rm requires a lump sum payment of F , which is
funded by a continuum of investors who are assumed to live from the innite
past to the innite future. In each period, they attempt to maximize a
discounted sum of net income ows in which future incomes are discounted
by the rate of r, as in the utility function of workers. They can borrow and
lend as much as they like at a market interest rate, the level of which equals
r in equilibrium and, thus, can establish as many rms as they want.
An established rm does not start production until its second period of
existence, but in the rst period, it recruits workers for production in the
next period. In addition, at the end of each period except the rst one, after
having paid wages and dividends in that period, some rms experience with
probability b such an idiosyncratic shock that they suddenly become unpro-
ductive. The rms that experience this shock are never productive again.
To formalize this assumption, the technology that rms use to produce the
consumption good is specied as
Y = z ~L;
where Y and ~L denote, respectively, the output of the consumption good
and the number of employees who are employable and have expended work
eorts. The value of ~L does not necessarily correspond to the total number
of employees since some of them might be either \unemployable" or \em-
ployable but expending zero eort." Firms take  and z as given: the former
is a common constant satisfying  2 (0; 1) and the latter is a rm-specic
productivity that initially takes a unitary value but irreversibly switches to
a zero value with probability b at the end of each period.
Let ~Lt+s, L
i
t+s, and w
i
t+s denote, respectively, the number of employees
who are employable and expending eorts in period t + s, the number of
employees who complete the ith period of service in that period, and the
level of the wage paid to those employees in that period. The assumption
on the production technology suggests that one of the tasks assigned to the
management of a rm is to make the value of ~Lt+s correspond to the total
number of employees,
Ps
i=1 L
i
t+s, for any value of s (> 0) by motivating
employable workers to expend work eorts while preventing unemployable
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ones from being added to the rm. This is not an easy task because of some
informational frictions built into this economy; these will be discussed in the
next subsection. In this subsection, we simply suppose that rms are able
to do this task. Then, the net gain from establishing a new rm in period t
is evaluated by investors as
 F + 1
1 + r
1X
s=1

1  b
1 + r
s 1
[(1s  Lt+s)  wt+s  Lt+s] ; (1)
where 1s, wt+s, and Lt+s denote, respectively, an s-dimensional all-ones
vector,
wt+s = (w
1
t+s;    ; wst+s);
and
Lt+s = (L
1
t+s;    ; Lst+s):
The rm maximizes (1) by optimally selecting a path of wages and employ-
ment, f(wt+s;Lt+s)g1s=1, since it is in the best interest of their investors.
2.3 Informational Frictions
In a given period t, the state of a worker who has already entered the
labor force can be summarized by a pair (nt; Qt). The rst variable, nt,
represents the worker's recent experience of (un)employment. Specically,
if nt is a positive integer, this worker enters the ntth period of service with
the current rm in period t. If nt is a negative integer, she enters the  ntth
period of continuing unemployment in period t. If nt = 0, she is born in
period t, and has not yet entered the labor force. Every job seeker has a
non-positive value for nt because workers are not allowed to hop directly
from one rm to another. If a worker separates from the current rm, then
she must experience at least one period of unemployment before being hired
by the next rm. The second variable, Qt, indicates her employability, and
takes a unitary value if she is employable at the beginning of period t and
zero otherwise. The following properties of this variable are easy to verify.
First, Qt = 1 for those who are born in period t   1 since every worker is
employable when entering the labor force. Second, if Qt = 0 for some t,
then Qt+s = 0 for all s > 0 since lost employability is never restored. Before
applying for a job opening in period t, jobless workers decide whether or not
to expend an employability-preserving eort, and thus, at the point of a job
interview, their employability in the next period (i.e., the value of Qt+1 for
each job applicant) is already determined.
Firms can observe an applicant's recent experience of employment (i.e.,
the value of nt) perfectly, but evaluate her employability in the next period
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(i.e., the value of Qt+1) only imperfectly. In job interviews, they can de-
tect an unemployable applicant only with a xed probability q (2 (0; 1)),
although they never mistake an employable applicant for an unemployable
one. Even after having started an employment relationship with a worker,
the rm can observe this employee's performance only imperfectly. Speci-
cally, when the employee does not expend work eorts, the rm can catch her
shirking only with probability q, although it never mistakes a non-shirking
employee for a shirking one. Neither the rm nor the employee herself can
verify the employee's employability or eort expenditure to a third party
such as the law court. All they can verify is whether or not the employee
has shown up at the oce and whether or not the rm has paid the promised
wage.
2.4 Sequence of Events within a Period
Events within a given period proceed as follows.
After the birth of new workers and the establishment of new rms, all
rms present in that period announce both their plan for current and future
hiring and wage levels for newly recruited and already-employed workers.
Firms may also announce the admissible duration of unemployment for job
applicants, which is used as a criterion to select the applicants to be inter-
viewed. Given these announcements, jobless workers decide whether or not
to continue maintaining their employability, and employed workers decide
whether or not to expend work eort in the current period. Then, rms
other than the newly established ones start production with the employees
recruited in or before the previous period. After production activities are
nished, wages are paid to employed workers. Then, a fraction b of oper-
ating rms become unproductive, and their employees lose their jobs. In
addition, labor contracts with workers who have been caught shirking are
terminated. Labor contracts with the other employed workers are renewed,
although some of them die at the end of the current period. To replace them,
the rms that survive into the next period post some job openings. Newly
born and jobless workers apply to these openings, and the rms interview
those who have passed the criteria, selecting new employees from among
them.
3 Labor Contracts and Aggregate Labor Demand
in Stationary Equilibria
The model constructed in the previous section potentially has a huge variety
of equilibria that yield qualitatively dierent outcomes. Instead of fully
characterizing them, we restrict our focus to a class of stationary equilibria
in which the wage paid to a worker depends solely on her length of service
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with her current employer. That is, if wnt+s denotes the level of wages paid
to the workers who are currently employed by a rm established in period
t and who complete their nth period of service in period t + s, then, in
such a stationary equilibrium, wnt+s takes a common value of w
n for any
combination of t and s, although wn may vary with n. In this section,
based on the assumption that all employed workers are employable, we rst
characterize the labor contract written in such a stationary equilibrium,
then use the free-entry condition to examine the determination of wages
and employment at an individual rm, and nally prole the aggregate
labor demand.
3.1 Labor Contracts
Under the informational frictions assumed in the previous section, a labor
contract that is acceptable to workers must be such that in any period, wage
payment is made if an employee shows up at the oce, independent of her
eort expenditure. Wage payment cannot be conditioned on the employee's
eort expenditure since it is unveriable. On the other hand, unconditional
payment of wages gives employees an incentive to shirk. To prevent this
moral hazard, the labor contract also stipulates that the wage level that the
rm should pay is signicantly higher than the employee's reservation, w;
that the term of the contract is one period; and that the contract terminates
unless both of the contracting parties agree to renew it. These clauses jointly
make termination of the contract highly damaging to the employee, thereby
enabling the rm to punish a shirking employee through that termination.5
Such an \at-will" employment relationship renders it dicult for a pair
of a rm and a worker to make the promise that the wage will increase
whenever the labor contract is renewed. If the starting wage is lower than
those supposed to be paid in and after the second period of service, the
rm naturally has an incentive to save labor costs by terminating the con-
tracts of current employees at the end of each period and recruiting new
workers at a low starting wage with the empty promise of a future raise.
Given the possibility of this moral hazard, newly recruited workers choose
to expend zero eort if their current wages are lower than those they are
supposed to receive in and after the next period because they regard such an
upward-sloping wage prole as an informal notice that their contracts will
be terminated at the end of the current period. To alleviate their suspicions
and, thus, to elicit their work eorts, the rm needs to make the starting
wage no lower than those paid in and after the second period of service.6
5Because an employee's eort expenditure is unveriable, it is impossible for a rm to
discipline its employees by use of such a bonding system in which, prior to starting work,
the employees post bond to a third party, such as the law court, which would be forfeited
by that party in the case of being caught shirking.
6This moral hazard incentive is introduced to make this model immune to the criticism
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The next proposition characterizes a prole of wages paid to an employee.
It is \almost" at in the sense that the employee receives a constant level of
wages in and after the second period of service with her employer, although
she is possibly better paid in the rst period.
Proposition 1 (Wage Prole). Suppose that the economy is settled in a
stationary equilibrium, and let V (n;Q) and wn denote the lifetime utility of
a worker in the labor force whose current state is (n;Q) and the wage level
an employed worker receives in the nth period of service with her employer,
respectively. Moreover, dene w2+ as
w2+  r + 
1 + r
V ( 1; 1) + 1 + r   (1  )(1  b)(1  q)
(1  )(1  b)q e: (2)
Then, wages are paid as w1  w2+ and wn = w2+ for 8n  2.
Proof. See Appendix A.
As long as wages are set as in Proposition 1, employed workers have no
incentive to shirk. In the rest of this paper, w1 and w2+ denote, respectively,
the wages paid to newly recruited workers and those paid to other employed
workers.
3.2 Aggregate Labor Demand
Our next task is to prole the aggregate labor demand, which is a relation
between the aggregate employment and a weighted average of w1 and w2+
that is implied by rms' optimizing behavior and the free-entry condition.
To this end, we rst need to show that in any stationary equilibrium,
all operating rms keep their number of employees constant over time at a
common level.
Lemma 1. Suppose that the economy is settled in a stationary equilibrium,
and let Lt+s represent the total number of employees a rm established in
by Carmichael (1985) of Shapiro-Stiglitz eciency wage model. The point of his criticism
is that even if rms are restricted to eliciting work eorts by paying eciency wages,
they can still sell their jobs and require newly recruited workers to accept a low starting
wage level, or pay an entrance fee. He asserts that, contrary to the argument of Shapiro
and Stiglitz, unemployment cannot be involuntary since the starting wage or entrance fee
clears the job market in each period. In the present model, however, the starting wage
may fail to clear the job market when its market-clearing level is suciently low. Firms
are reluctant to set the starting wage at such a low level, being apprehensive that this may
induce newly recruited workers to expend zero eort. To make the labor contract with
them \credible," rms rather choose to set the starting wage at a suciently high level,
which causes job rationing and involuntary unemployment in the job market. Similar
arguments are made by Arvan and Esfahani (1993) and Ritter and Taylor (1994).
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period t puts into production activities in period t + s. Then, for 8t and
8s ( 1),
Lt+s = L;
where the value of L is given by
L 1 = w1   (1  b)(1  )(w
1   w2+)
1 + r
( w^): (3)
Proof. See Appendix A.
This lemma might give a paradoxical impression since it asserts that
new rms, which have just started production (thus having no option but to
use only newly recruited workers) and old rms, which started production
one or more periods before (thus being not so dependent on newly recruited
workers) would choose the same number of employees even when w1 > w2+.
This result is accounted for by the fact that in choosing the number of
employees, rms only consider the expected sum of wages that will be paid
to a marginally hired worker, which is given by
w1 +
1X
s=1

(1  b)(1  )
1 + r
s
w2+ =
1 + r
1 + r   (1  )(1  b) w^:
As suggested by this equation, the expected wage payment can be averaged
out to w^ per period. Regardless of their histories, all of the operating rms
view w^ as the marginal cost of labor, and they thus choose the same number
of employees.
In a stationary equilibrium in which a positive number of rms are op-
erating, the net gain from investing in a new rm is reduced to zero by free
entry. This uniquely determines the values of w^ and L, given , b, r and F .
Lemma 2. Suppose that the economy is settled in a stationary equilibrium,
where the net gain from investing in a new rm is reduced to zero by free
entry. Then, in that equilibrium, every operating rm sets w^ and L as
w^ =

(1  )1 
(r + b)1 F 1 
1=
( w); L =

(r + b)F
1  
1=
( L): (4)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Now we can state the following.
Proposition 2 (Aggregate Labor Demand). Suppose that the economy is
settled in a stationary equilibrium, and let E denote the aggregate employ-
ment, whereas w^ and w are dened by (3) and (4), respectively. Then, in
that equilibrium, E and w^ satisfy
(w^   w)E = 0; E  0 and w^   w  0: (5)
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Figure 1: Aggregate Labor Demand
Proof. See Appendix A.
Figure 1 depicts a locus of pairs of E and w^ satisfying (5). To see why
the locus is L-shaped, we need to recall the denitions of w^ and w. As
implied by (3), w^ is the marginal labor cost incurred by a rm when it hires
an additional worker. To motivate this worker, the rm must, on average,
pay w^ units of wage per period. On the other hand, w is the break-even
level of w^, at which the net gain from establishing a new rm becomes zero.
When w^ > w, operating rms, if they exist, cannot discipline their employ-
ees without paying wages that are higher than their break-even levels. This
deprives investors of the incentive to establish a new rm, which ultimately
reduces the number of operating rms and, thus, the aggregate labor de-
mand, to zero. When w^ < w, in contrast, operating rms can discipline
their employees by paying wages that are lower than their break-even levels.
This gives investors a strong incentive to establish a new rm, which ulti-
mately makes the number of operating rms and, thus, the aggregate labor
demand, innitely large. However, such a large labor demand cannot be
met by any means, meaning that there is no such equilibrium with w^ < w
in this model. Finally, when w^ = w, the net gain from establishing a new
rm becomes zero, which makes the number of operating rms and, thus,
the aggregate labor demand, indeterminate.
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Table 1: Model Parameters
Workers r Discount rate 0.01
 Death rate 0.03
w Income when unemployed 1.00
e Work eort 0.50
N Population of the labor force 1.00
Firms  Labor share in production 0.70
b Business closing rate 0.04
q Rate of detecting unemployable and shirking workers 0.90
4 Firms' Belief, Ranking, and Aggregate Incentive
Constraints
To determine the equilibrium values of E and w^, we also have to derive
the aggregate incentive constraints (AIC). A prole of an AIC provides the
level of w^ rms would choose given the level of E, although it is dened
only when that level of w^ is high enough to motivate the jobless workers
whom rms believe to be employable to actually preserve their employability.
As in other models of eciency wages, rms choose a wage level with the
goal of preventing their employees from shirking. In this model, moreover,
these wages then unintentionally keep some jobless workers from becoming
unemployable. Because our focus is on a stationary equilibrium in which
rms' belief is fully supported, the AIC must be consistent with their belief
about jobless workers' employability.
We index rms' belief about jobless workers' employability by a non-
positive integer n, which means that they believe that job applicants with
n 2 [n; 0], who have been unemployed for no more than  n periods, are
still employable, while other applicants are unemployable. When rms have
a belief indexed by n, they naturally \rank" job applicants by their unem-
ployment duration or, more specically, set the admissible level of unem-
ployment duration for job applicants at n, thereby disqualifying applicants
with n < n. Obviously, this hiring policy discourages those who have been
unemployed for more than  n periods from preserving their employability,
which partially fullls rms' belief. The question is whether this really mo-
tivates other jobless workers to preserve their employability, as rms believe.
Checking whether or not this condition is met for qualied workers is such a
detailed process that we cannot but resort to a numerical method to derive
an AIC prole for each value of n.
Figures 2 and 3 depict the proles of the AICs that are obtained with
this numerical method under the parameter conguration of Table 1.7 For
7For the details of the derivation, see Appendix B. Since the expected length of a
worker's stay in the labor force is given by 1=, we have eectively assumed that workers
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0.82 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.9 0.92 0.94 0.96
1.54
1.56
1.58
1.6
1.62
1.64
w
∗∗∗∗
w
∗∗∗
E
∗∗∗∗
E
∗∗∗
n = −1
n = −2 n = −3
n = −∞
E
wˆ
Figure 3: AICs for Various Values of n (Enlarged)
16
Table 2: New Notations
Notation Denition Implied Value
E [=( + b  b)]N 0:436
E [1=(1 + b  b)]N 0:963
E (1  b)N 0:960
w w + f[1 + r   (1  )(1  b)(1  q)]=(1  )(1  b)qge 1:547
w w + f[1 + r + (1  )b]=(1  )(1  b)qge 1:626
w w + [(1 + r)=(1  )(1  b)q]e 1:603
conciseness in expression, these gures use some new notations: E, E,
E, w, w, and w. Their denitions and implied values under the
above parameter conguration are summarized in Table 2.
As shown in Figure 2, the prole of the AIC for n = 0 is derived for
relatively small values of E, while those of the AICs for n < 0 are derived for
relatively large values of E. This contrast is mostly attributable to whether
or not jobless workers are given \second chances," that is, chances to be
rehired. When n = 0, rms ll their vacancies exclusively with new entrants
into the labor force, and thus there is no second chance for jobless workers.
Because of this exclusive hiring policy, even if all the new entrants are hired
in every period, the aggregate employment cannot exceed E, which, under
our parameter conguration, means that more than half of the labor force is
left in the jobless state. When n < 0, rms ll their vacancies not only with
new entrants but also with those who have been unemployed for  n periods
or less, and thus, there are some second chances for jobless workers. Such
an inclusive hiring policy makes it possible for the aggregate employment to
be as large as E. When E = E, in particular, all workers but those
who have just lost their jobs are employed; equivalently, every job seeker
can nd a job by experiencing only one period of unemployment. These
imply that there are no workers who have been unemployed for two periods
or more, and thus that, as long as n < 0, the dierence in the value of n has
no eect on equilibrium outcomes. This is why proles of AICs for n < 0
have a common vertical part.
The reason proles of the AICs for n < 0 cannot be derived for relatively
small values of E is explained as follows. As E takes a smaller value, the
job nding rate for jobless workers decreases its value, which enables rms
to discipline their employees by paying lower wages. At the same time, the
lower rate of job nding and lower wages after being rehired gradually reduce
spend an average of 33.3 periods in the labor force by setting the value of  at 0.03. The
life expectancy of a rm is 1=b = 25 periods, and the expected duration of an employ-
ment relationship is 1=( + b  b)  14:5 periods. Moreover, the probability of \lifelong
employment," that is, the probability that a newly recruited worker will not experience
unemployment until she dies, is =( + b  b)  0:43, which implies that more than 56%
of newly recruited workers experience unemployment at least once during their lives.
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the incentive of jobless workers to preserve their employability, eventually
obliterating it. This runs counter to rms' belief of n < 0, therefore, AICs
cannot be dened for such small values of E.
This argument helps us understand why proles of the AICs for n < 0
have an upward-sloping part, while that of the AIC for n = 0 has a horizontal
part instead. As already explained, when n < 0, a smaller value of E enables
rms to discipline their employees by paying lower wages, which explains
why the AICs for n < 0 have an upward-sloping part. When n = 0, on the
other hand, there is no second chance for jobless workers, and thus, their job
nding rate always takes the zero value. As a result, neither the incentive
of employed workers to expend eorts nor rms' wage-setting behavior is
aected by any change in E, which is the intuition behind the horizontal
part of the AIC for n = 0.
Figures 2 and 3 also show that a decrease in n rotates the upward-
sloping part of the AIC for n < 0 counterclockwise around its upper end,
gradually shortening its length.8 Such a decrease in n qualies a larger
set of jobless workers for the given vacant positions, thereby reducing the
probability that a qualied worker will be rehired. From the viewpoint of
currently employed workers, this eectively stiens the penalty for shirking
since, if they lose their current jobs under the smaller value of n, they are
likely to experience a longer duration of unemployment before nding a new
job. This, in turn, enables rms to discipline their employees by paying lower
wages in accordance with the level of E, which leads to the counterclockwise
rotation of AIC. From the viewpoint of currently jobless workers, the same
decrease in n eectively reduces the probability that they will be rehired
since it enlarges the set of jobless workers who are qualied for employment.
This discourages them from preserving their employability, which cannot be
undone by anything but the prospect that they will receive suciently high
wages after reemployment. This is why the upward-sloping part of AIC is
shortened as n takes a smaller value.
5 Stationary Equilibria with and without Second
Chances
We now are in a position to examine the stationary equilibria of this model.
A stationary equilibrium in which rms embrace the belief of n is an in-
tersection of the loci of the aggregate labor demand and the AIC for n.
Considering the qualitative dierence between the AIC for n = 0 and those
8In Figures 2 and 3, the upward-sloping parts of the AICs for n   4 are not depicted
except for n =  1 because they are hidden by that of the AIC for n =  3. The only
dierence among the upward-sloping parts of the AICs for n   3 is their lengths: as n
takes a smaller value, the length of the upward-sloping part becomes shorter.
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Table 3: Critical Values of F
Notation Denition Implied Value
F1 (1  )(=w)=(1 )=(r + b) 0:840
F2 (1  )(=w)=(1 )=(r + b) 0:868
F3 (1  )(=w)=(1 )=(r + b) 0:943
for n < 0, we call the equilibrium with n = 0 the \no-second-chance equi-
librium" (NSCE), and those with n < 0 \second-chance equilibria" (SCE).
5.1 Diagrammatic Expositions
In examining the NSCE and SCE, we should pay attention to the entry cost
for new rms, F , since, as shown in (2), it is the primary determinant of the
aggregate labor demand, w, dened by (4).
For analytical convenience, we dene F1, F2, and F3 as in Table 3, the
third column of which reports their implied values under the parameter
conguration of Table 1. As is easily veried, w is a decreasing function of
F with
w =
8<:
w if F = F1,
w if F = F2,
w if F = F3,
where w, w, and w are as dened in Table 2. Dependent on the
amount of the entry cost, four patterns are conceivable for the existence of
the SCE and NSCE.
Figure 4 depicts a case in which the entry cost is suciently small,
F 2 [0; F1], by conguring the parameters as in Table 1. In such a case, the
model has a unique SCE and a unique NSCE, which suggests that whether
rms believe that those who have experienced unemployment are no longer
employable is critical in determining the equilibrium of this economy; other
aspects of their belief have no eect on this determination. This can be
explained as follows. Small costs of entry, which characterize the present
cases, promote the establishment of new rms, thereby making the labor
market so tight that all job seekers in each period can nd jobs. In the SCE,
in particular, every jobless worker can nd a new job if she experiences only
one period of unemployment. As a result, there are no workers who have
been unemployed for more than one period, which makes all details of rms'
belief except for whether n = 0 is satised insignicant.
Figure 5 depicts a case in which the entry cost is not so small, F 2
(F1; F3), using the same conguration of parameters as in Figure 4. Again,
there is a unique NSCE in this model. In addition, there are multiple SCEs,
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Figure 4: SCE and NSCE when F 2 [0; F1]
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Figure 5: SCE and NSCE when F 2 (F1; F3)
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Figure 6: NSCE when F = F3
as depicted in Figure 5. The reason SCEs are so diversied in this case will
be considered in the next subsection.
Figures 6 and 7 depict cases in which the entry cost is large, F 2
[F3;+1). In these cases, the SCE does not exist since any level of w^ at which
investors can break even or prot is too low to motivate jobless workers to
preserve their employability. In contrast, the NSCE still exists for these
cases, but its status changes according to the value of F . When F = F3,
there is a continuum of NSCEs, which are dierentiated from one another
by E. Across them, the job nding rate increases its value from zero to
unity as E increases from zero to [=( + b  b)]N .9 When F 2 (F3;+1),
there is a unique NSCE, the aggregate employment of which equals zero.
There, w, which is the minimum level of w^ that can motivate employed
workers, is too high for investors to break even or prot by investing in a
new rm, and thus, no rm is established. As a result, there is no job oer
to newly born workers, who then have no choice but to live by consuming
their endowments in each period. Put another way, not only second chances
but also rst ones are completely destroyed in this case.
9Using welfare measures dened in the next subsection, we can even show that these
equilibria can be Pareto-ranked by E; that is, an equilibrium indexed by a larger value of
E dominates that by a smaller value in the Paretian sense. Intuitively, a larger value of E
improves economic welfare by raising the job nding rate, as well as by increasing the total
amount of the net prot payment, which is composed of the prots earned by currently
operating rms minus the entry costs paid by investors for establishing new rms.
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Figure 7: NSCE when F 2 (F3;+1)
5.2 Numerical Derivation of Stationary Equilibria
Despite its comprehensibility, diagrammatic expositions can only provide a
sketch of the stationary equilibria that exist in this model. To take a close
look at these equilibria, we will numerically derive the equilibrium values of
w^, E, UO, a, L
, E=L, w1, and w2+ for such values of n and F as
n = 0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 10; 20; 30; 1;
F =

0:1i for i = 1; 2;    ; 8
F 1 0:1j1 F
0:1j
3 for j = 0; 1; 2;    ; 10
and F > F3;
where UO and a, respectively, represent the population of unemployable
workers and the per-period job nding rate for employable workers.10
Tables 4{9 report the results of this numerical analysis. As suggested
by these tables, when the value of F is increased from below to above F1,
the number of SCE suddenly explodes from one to positive innity. To
understand why, we need to recall that the equilibrium value of w^, w,
decreases as F takes a larger value. As long as F is smaller than F1, the
level of w is high enough to motivate employed workers, even when nding
a new job takes only one period of unemployment experience. If F takes
a larger value than F1, in contrast, the level of w
 becomes so low that it
cannot motivate employed workers unless nding a new job takes more than
one period of unemployment experience. As a consequence, only a subset of
10For the details of the derivation, see Appendix C.
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Table 4: Aggregate Employment (E)
n
F w^ 0  1  2  3  4  5  10  20  30  1
0.1 4.047 0.436 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963
0.2 3.007 0.436 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963
0.3 2.527 0.436 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963
0.4 2.234 0.436 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963
0.5 2.031 0.436 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963
0.6 1.878 0.436 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963
0.7 1.758 0.436 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963
0.8 1.660 0.436 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963
0.840 (F1) 1.626 (w
) 0.436 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963
0.850 1.618 0.436 0.958 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.962
0.860 1.610 0.436 0.954 0.960 0.961 0.961 0.961 0.961 0.961 0.961 0.961
0.870 1.602 0.436 0.948 0.958 0.960 0.960 0.960 0.960 0.960 0.960 NA
0.880 1.594 0.436 0.941 0.956 0.959 0.959 0.959 0.959 0.959 NA NA
0.890 1.586 0.436 0.932 0.954 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958 NA NA NA
0.900 1.578 0.436 0.921 0.951 0.956 0.957 0.957 0.957 NA NA NA
0.911 1.570 0.436 0.906 0.947 0.955 0.956 0.956 NA NA NA NA
0.922 1.562 0.436 0.886 0.943 0.953 0.955 0.955 NA NA NA NA
0.932 1.555 0.436 0.856 0.938 0.952 NA NA NA NA NA NA
0.943 (F3) 1.547 (w
) 0.436 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
F > F3 1.547 (w
) 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Note: The largest possible value is reported when (F; n) = (F3; 0).
Table 5: Population of Unemployable Workers (UO)
n
F 0  1  2  3  4  5  10  20  30  1
0.1 0.564 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.2 0.564 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.3 0.564 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.4 0.564 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.5 0.564 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.6 0.564 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.7 0.564 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.8 0.564 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.840 (F1) 0.564 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.850 0.564 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
0.860 0.564 0.009 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
0.870 0.564 0.015 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 NA
0.880 0.564 0.022 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 NA NA
0.890 0.564 0.031 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 NA NA NA
0.900 0.564 0.043 0.007 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 NA NA NA
0.911 0.564 0.057 0.010 0.001 0.000 0.000 NA NA NA NA
0.922 0.564 0.078 0.013 0.002 0.000 0.000 NA NA NA NA
0.932 0.564 0.108 0.018 0.002 NA NA NA NA NA NA
0.943 (F3) 0.564 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
F > F3 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Note: The smallest possible value is reported when (F; n) = (F3; 0).
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Table 6: Per-Period Job Finding Rate for Employable Workers (a)
n
F 0  1  2  3  4  5  10  20  30  1
0.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.840 (F1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.850 1 0.997 0.987 0.986 0.986 0.986 0.986 0.986 0.986 0.986
0.860 1 0.992 0.974 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972
0.870 1 0.987 0.962 0.959 0.959 0.959 0.959 0.959 0.959 NA
0.880 1 0.981 0.949 0.945 0.945 0.945 0.945 0.945 NA NA
0.890 1 0.974 0.937 0.932 0.931 0.931 0.931 NA NA NA
0.900 1 0.964 0.924 0.918 0.918 0.918 0.918 NA NA NA
0.911 1 0.951 0.911 0.905 0.904 0.904 NA NA NA NA
0.922 1 0.934 0.897 0.891 0.891 0.891 NA NA NA NA
0.932 1 0.907 0.881 0.878 NA NA NA NA NA NA
0.943 (F3) 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
F > F3 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Note: The largest possible value is reported when (F; n) = (F3; 0).
Table 7: Number of Operating Firms (E=L)
n
F L 0  1  2  3  4  5  10  20  30  1
0.1 0.003 151.27 333.95 333.95 333.95 333.95 333.95 333.95 333.95 333.95 333.95
0.2 0.008 56.20 124.06 124.06 124.06 124.06 124.06 124.06 124.06 124.06 124.06
0.3 0.014 31.49 69.52 69.52 69.52 69.52 69.52 69.52 69.52 69.52 69.52
0.4 0.021 20.88 46.09 46.09 46.09 46.09 46.09 46.09 46.09 46.09 46.09
0.5 0.029 15.18 33.51 33.51 33.51 33.51 33.51 33.51 33.51 33.51 33.51
0.6 0.037 11.70 25.82 25.82 25.82 25.82 25.82 25.82 25.82 25.82 25.82
0.7 0.046 9.39 20.72 20.72 20.72 20.72 20.72 20.72 20.72 20.72 20.72
0.8 0.056 7.76 17.12 17.12 17.12 17.12 17.12 17.12 17.12 17.12 17.12
0.840 (F1) 0.060 7.23 15.97 15.97 15.97 15.97 15.97 15.97 15.97 15.97 15.97
0.850 0.061 7.11 15.64 15.69 15.69 15.69 15.69 15.69 15.69 15.69 15.69
0.860 0.062 7.00 15.30 15.41 15.42 15.42 15.42 15.42 15.42 15.42 15.42
0.870 0.063 6.88 14.96 15.13 15.15 15.15 15.15 15.15 15.15 15.15 NA
0.880 0.064 6.77 14.60 14.85 14.89 14.89 14.89 14.89 14.89 NA NA
0.890 0.065 6.66 14.23 14.57 14.63 14.63 14.63 14.63 NA NA NA
0.900 0.067 6.55 13.83 14.28 14.37 14.37 14.38 14.38 NA NA NA
0.911 0.068 6.44 13.38 14.00 14.11 14.12 14.12 NA NA NA NA
0.922 0.069 6.34 12.87 13.71 13.86 13.88 13.88 NA NA NA NA
0.932 0.070 6.23 12.24 13.40 13.61 NA NA NA NA NA NA
0.943 (F3) 0.071 6.13 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
F > F3 0.071 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Note: The largest possible value is reported when (F; n) = (F3; 0).
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Table 8: Starting Wage (w1)
n
F w^ 0  1  2  3  4  5  10  20  30  1
0.1 4.047 33.594 6.197 6.197 6.197 6.197 6.197 6.197 6.197 6.197 6.197
0.2 3.007 20.262 4.234 4.234 4.234 4.234 4.234 4.234 4.234 4.234 4.234
0.3 2.527 14.114 3.328 3.328 3.328 3.328 3.328 3.328 3.328 3.328 3.328
0.4 2.234 10.356 2.775 2.775 2.775 2.775 2.775 2.775 2.775 2.775 2.775
0.5 2.031 7.744 2.390 2.390 2.390 2.390 2.390 2.390 2.390 2.390 2.390
0.6 1.878 5.788 2.102 2.102 2.102 2.102 2.102 2.102 2.102 2.102 2.102
0.7 1.758 4.249 1.875 1.875 1.875 1.875 1.875 1.875 1.875 1.875 1.875
0.8 1.660 2.996 1.691 1.691 1.691 1.691 1.691 1.691 1.691 1.691 1.691
0.840 (F1) 1.626 (w
) 2.556 1.626 1.626 1.626 1.626 1.626 1.626 1.626 1.626 1.626
0.850 1.618 2.453 1.618 1.618 1.618 1.618 1.618 1.618 1.618 1.618 1.618
0.860 1.610 2.350 1.610 1.610 1.610 1.610 1.610 1.618 1.610 1.610 1.610
0.870 1.602 2.248 1.602 1.602 1.602 1.602 1.602 1.602 1.602 1.602 NA
0.880 1.594 2.146 1.594 1.594 1.594 1.594 1.594 1.594 1.594 NA NA
0.890 1.586 2.045 1.586 1.586 1.586 1.586 1.586 1.586 NA NA NA
0.900 1.578 1.945 1.578 1.578 1.578 1.578 1.578 1.578 NA NA NA
0.911 1.570 1.844 1.570 1.570 1.570 1.570 1.570 NA NA NA NA
0.922 1.562 1.745 1.562 1.562 1.562 1.562 1.562 NA NA NA NA
0.932 1.555 1.646 1.555 1.555 1.555 NA NA NA NA NA NA
0.943 (F3) 1.547 (w
) 1.547 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
F > F3 1.547 (w
) 1.547 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Table 9: Wage Paid in and after the Second Period of Service (w2+)
n
F w^ 0  1  2  3  4  5  10  20  30  1
0.1 4.047 1.547 3.865 3.865 3.865 3.865 3.865 3.865 3.865 3.865 3.865
0.2 3.007 1.547 2.903 2.903 2.903 2.903 2.903 2.903 2.903 2.903 2.903
0.3 2.527 1.547 2.460 2.460 2.460 2.460 2.460 2.460 2.460 2.460 2.460
0.4 2.234 1.547 2.189 2.189 2.189 2.189 2.189 2.189 2.189 2.189 2.189
0.5 2.031 1.547 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000
0.6 1.878 1.547 1.859 1.859 1.859 1.859 1.859 1.859 1.859 1.859 1.859
0.7 1.758 1.547 1.748 1.748 1.748 1.748 1.748 1.748 1.748 1.748 1.748
0.8 1.660 1.547 1.657 1.657 1.657 1.657 1.657 1.657 1.657 1.657 1.657
0.840 (F1) 1.626 (w
) 1.547 1.626 1.626 1.626 1.626 1.626 1.626 1.626 1.626 1.626
0.850 1.618 1.547 1.618 1.618 1.618 1.618 1.618 1.618 1.618 1.618 1.618
0.860 1.610 1.547 1.610 1.610 1.610 1.610 1.610 1.610 1.610 1.610 1.610
0.870 1.602 1.547 1.602 1.602 1.602 1.602 1.602 1.602 1.602 1.602 NA
0.880 1.594 1.547 1.594 1.594 1.594 1.594 1.594 1.594 1.594 NA NA
0.890 1.586 1.547 1.586 1.586 1.586 1.586 1.586 1.586 NA NA NA
0.900 1.578 1.547 1.578 1.578 1.578 1.578 1.578 1.578 NA NA NA
0.911 1.570 1.547 1.570 1.570 1.570 1.570 1.570 NA NA NA NA
0.922 1.562 1.547 1.562 1.562 1.562 1.562 1.562 NA NA NA NA
0.932 1.555 1.547 1.555 1.555 1.555 NA NA NA NA NA NA
0.943 (F3) 1.547 (w
) 1.547 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
F > F3 1.547 (w
) 1.547 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
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job seekers are hired in equilibrium, which creates room for rms' belief to
play a crucial role in selecting job applicants, thereby diversifying the SCEs.
All of the diversied SCEs, each of which corresponds to a single belief
such that n < 0, remain in existence as long as F 2 (F1; F2]. However, if
F exceeds F2, they start to decrease in number, and cease to exist before
F reaches F3. As shown in the tables, an SCE characterized by a smaller
n ceases to exist earlier than those by larger ns. A larger value of F and
its resulting lower value of w weaken the incentive of jobless workers to
preserve their employability, thereby making it more dicult for an SCE to
satisfy all of its EPCs, the number of which is equal to the absolute value
of n. When F is suciently close to F3, even the SCE with n =  1 cannot
satisfy its single EPC. Thus, the last SCE vanishes from the economy.
5.3 Welfare Comparison among the Existing Equilibria
To evaluate the economic welfare of the existing equilibria, we construct
three measures of economic welfare: workers' surplus (WS), investors' sur-
plus (IS), and their sum, which we call total surplus (TS), as follows.
WS 
1X
t=0

1
1 + r
t
[ ~wE + w(N   E)  e(N   UO)] ;
IS 
1X
t=0

1
1 + r
t
 E
L
 [(L)   ~wL   bF ];
TS  WS+IS
=
1X
t=0

1
1 + r
t 
E(L) 1 + w(N   E)  bFE
L
  e(N   UO)

;
where ~w  w1  (1 )(1  b)(w1 w2+).11 As dened above, the WS is the
discounted sum of workers' incomes minus their eort expenditures. In each
period, employed workers receive, on average, ~w units of labor income, and
jobless ones receive w units of endowment; these add up to ~wE+w(N  E).
Moreover, employable workers, the population of which is equal to N  UO,
expend e units of eort. Thus, the workers constituting the labor force
receive, on aggregate, ~wE +w(N  E)  e(N  UO) units of surplus, which
11We can also express ~w as the average of average labor costs. While marginal labor
costs are common across all rms and equal to w^ dened by (3), the average labor costs of
new rms, which have just started production, may dier from those of old rms, which
started production one or more periods before. On the one hand, the average labor costs
of new rms, the number of which is b, are given by w1 since all of their employees are
newly recruited workers. On the other hand, the average labor costs of old rms, the
number of which is 1  b, is given by w1+(1  )w2+ since newly recruited workers only
account for a fraction  of their employees. By averaging out these average costs over all
operating rms, we can obtain the denition of ~w.
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Table 10: Workers' Surplus
n
F 0  1  2  3  4  5  10  20  30  1
0.1 200.17 344.69 344.69 344.69 344.69 344.69 344.69 344.69 344.69 344.69
0.2 159.78 244.45 244.45 244.45 244.45 244.45 244.45 244.45 244.45 244.45
0.3 141.15 198.23 198.23 198.23 198.23 198.23 198.23 198.23 198.23 198.23
0.4 129.76 169.98 169.98 169.98 169.98 169.98 169.98 169.98 169.98 169.98
0.5 121.85 150.34 150.34 150.34 150.34 150.34 150.34 150.34 150.34 150.34
0.6 115.92 135.64 135.64 135.64 135.64 135.64 135.64 135.64 135.64 135.64
0.7 111.26 124.07 124.07 124.07 124.07 124.07 124.07 124.07 124.07 124.07
0.8 107.46 114.65 114.65 114.65 114.65 114.65 114.65 114.65 114.65 114.65
0.840 (F1) 106.13 111.34 111.34 111.34 111.34 111.34 111.34 111.34 111.34 111.34
0.850 105.81 110.51 110.50 110.50 110.50 110.50 110.50 110.50 110.50 110.50
0.860 105.50 109.68 109.67 109.66 109.66 109.66 109.66 109.66 109.66 109.66
0.870 105.19 108.86 108.84 108.83 108.83 108.83 108.83 108.83 108.83 NA
0.880 104.89 108.04 108.01 108.01 108.01 108.01 108.01 108.01 NA NA
0.890 104.58 107.22 107.19 107.19 107.19 107.19 107.19 NA NA NA
0.900 104.27 106.40 106.37 106.37 106.37 106.37 106.37 NA NA NA
0.911 103.97 105.58 105.55 105.55 105.55 105.55 NA NA NA NA
0.922 103.67 104.75 104.74 104.74 104.74 104.74 NA NA NA NA
0.932 103.37 103.91 103.93 103.94 NA NA NA NA NA NA
0.943 (F3) 103.07 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
F > F3 101 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Note: The largest possible value is reported when (F; n) = (F3; 0).
is the summand without the discount factor in the dening equation of the
WS. The IS is a discounted sum of \net prot ows" from the rm sector to
the investors, that is, prots earned by currently operating rms minus the
entry costs needed to establish new rms. In each period, operating rms
distribute their prots to investors, which add up to (E=L)[(L)   ~wL].
On the other hand, the investors pay an aggregate of b(E=L)F to fund
new rms. Thus, on balance, (E=L)[(L)  ~wL bF ] units of net prot
ow from the rm sector to the investors. This is the summand without the
discount factor in the dening equation of the IS. The TS is the discounted
sum of the net output of this economy, that is, the sum of the produced
and endowed consumption goods minus investment in new rms and eort
expenditures.12
Tables 10{12 report, respectively, the values of the WS, IS, and TS, which
are computed under the parameter conguration of Table 1. As shown in
these tables, for a given entry cost level, the decrease in n from 0 to  1
produces signicant welfare gains, whereas other decreases in n produce
only small ones. To understand why, we must note that a decrease in n has
two conicting eects on TS. On the one hand, it increases the aggregate
employment, thereby enhancing the total amounts of labor incomes and net
prot ows, which contributes to an enhancement of the TS. On the other
12In fact, WS and IS can be interpreted as, respectively, the discounted sum of the
lifetime utilities of the workers constituting the labor force in the present and future periods
and the discounted sum of expected gains from past, current, and future investments. For
the details, see Appendix D.
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Table 11: Investors' Surplus
n
F 0  1  2  3  4  5  10  20  30  1
0.1 28.29 35.82 35.82 35.82 35.82 35.82 35.82 35.82 35.82 35.82
0.2 18.95 26.25 26.25 26.25 26.25 26.25 26.25 26.25 26.25 26.25
0.3 14.64 21.84 21.84 21.84 21.84 21.84 21.84 21.84 21.84 21.84
0.4 12.01 19.15 19.15 19.15 19.15 19.15 19.15 19.15 19.15 19.15
0.5 10.18 17.27 17.27 17.27 17.27 17.27 17.27 17.27 17.27 17.27
0.6 8.81 15.87 15.87 15.87 15.87 15.87 15.87 15.87 15.87 15.87
0.7 7.73 14.76 14.76 14.76 14.76 14.76 14.76 14.76 14.76 14.76
0.8 6.85 13.86 13.86 13.86 13.86 13.86 13.86 13.86 13.86 13.86
0.840 (F1) 6.55 13.55 13.55 13.55 13.55 13.55 13.55 13.55 13.55 13.55
0.850 6.47 13.42 13.47 13.47 13.47 13.47 13.47 13.47 13.47 13.47
0.860 6.40 13.29 13.38 13.39 13.39 13.39 13.39 13.39 13.39 13.39
0.870 6.33 13.14 13.29 13.31 13.31 13.31 13.31 13.31 13.31 NA
0.880 6.26 12.98 13.20 13.23 13.23 13.23 13.23 13.23 NA NA
0.890 6.19 12.79 13.10 13.15 13.15 13.15 13.15 NA NA NA
0.900 6.12 12.58 12.99 13.07 13.07 13.07 13.07 NA NA NA
0.911 6.05 12.31 12.88 12.98 12.99 12.99 NA NA NA NA
0.922 5.98 11.98 12.76 12.90 12.91 12.92 NA NA NA NA
0.932 5.91 11.52 12.62 12.81 NA NA NA NA NA NA
0.943 (F3) 5.84 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
F > F3 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Note: The largest possible value is reported when (F; n) = (F3; 0).
Table 12: Total Surplus
n
F 0  1  2  3  4  5  10  20  30  1
0.1 228.46 380.51 380.51 380.51 380.51 380.51 380.51 380.51 380.51 380.51
0.2 178.73 270.71 270.71 270.71 270.71 270.71 270.71 270.71 270.71 270.71
0.3 155.79 220.07 220.07 220.07 220.07 220.07 220.07 220.07 220.07 220.07
0.4 141.77 189.13 189.13 189.13 189.13 189.13 189.13 189.13 189.13 189.13
0.5 132.03 167.62 167.62 167.62 167.62 167.62 167.62 167.62 167.62 167.62
0.6 124.73 151.50 151.50 151.50 151.50 151.50 151.50 151.50 151.50 151.50
0.7 118.99 138.83 138.83 138.83 138.83 138.83 138.83 138.83 138.83 138.83
0.8 114.32 128.51 128.51 128.51 128.51 128.51 128.51 128.51 128.51 128.51
0.840 (F1) 112.67 124.89 124.89 124.89 124.89 124.89 124.89 124.89 124.89 124.89
0.850 112.29 123.93 123.97 123.97 123.97 123.97 123.97 123.97 123.97 123.97
0.860 111.91 122.96 123.04 123.05 123.05 123.05 123.05 123.05 123.05 123.05
0.870 111.52 122.00 122.13 122.14 122.14 122.14 122.14 122.14 122.14 NA
0.880 111.15 121.01 121.21 121.24 121.24 121.24 121.24 121.24 NA NA
0.890 110.77 120.01 120.28 120.33 120.34 120.34 120.34 NA NA NA
0.900 110.39 118.98 119.36 119.43 119.44 119.44 119.44 NA NA NA
0.911 110.02 117.89 118.43 118.54 118.55 118.55 NA NA NA NA
0.922 109.65 116.73 117.50 117.64 117.66 117.66 NA NA NA NA
0.932 109.28 115.43 116.55 116.75 NA NA NA NA NA NA
0.943 (F3) 108.91 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
F > F3 101 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Note: The largest possible value is reported when (F; n) = (F3; 0).
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hand, it increases the number of employable workers, thereby increasing
the total expenditure of eorts, which contributes to a reduction in the
TS. Therefore, the eects of a decrease in n on the TS are theoretically
inconclusive since it always increases IS and has mixed eects on the WS.
When n is decreased from 0 to  1, both IS and WS increase their values,
and therefore, TS also exhibits a substantial enhancement. This decrease in
n substantially increases the populations of employed and employable work-
ers. As stated above, the increase in employed workers enhances IS and WS,
while the increase in employable workers reduces WS. Despite this friction,
WS increases its value in this case since the positive contribution through
the increased labor income, (1 + r 1)( ~w   w)E, dominates the negative
contribution through the increased eort expenditure, (1 + r 1)eUO.
In contrast, when n is decreased from  1 or a smaller value to a further
smaller one, none of WS, IS, or TS exhibit a substantial change for any
level of the entry cost. When F is no larger than F1, the existing SCEs are
coalesced into one equilibrium, and thus, any decrease in n has no marginal
eect on WS, IS, or TS. When F takes a value between F1 and F3 but is
not so close to F3, the existing SCEs are so close to one another that any
decrease in n can hardly change the values of E and UO, thus producing only
small changes in WS, IS, and TS at best.13 When F takes a value between
F1 and F3 that is suciently close to F3, a decrease in n may lead to a
substantial increase in E and a substantial decrease in UO. For example,
when F = 0:932, the decrease in n from  1 to  2 increases E by 0:082 and
reduces UO by 0:090 (See Tables 4 and 5). However, these changes do not
lead to a substantial enhancement of WS because the positive contribution
through the increased labor income, (1 + r 1)( ~w   w)E  4:58, is mostly
oset by the negative contribution through the increased eort expenditure,
(1+r 1)eUO   4:56. On the other hand, the increased employment also
enhances IS by 1:10, which explains the greater part of the enhancement of
TS observed in this case.
5.4 Policy Implications
The theoretical and numerical analyses made thus far yield the following
policy implications. First, second chances should be given to jobless workers.
It is clear from the second and third columns of Table 12, which summarize
the total surpluses for the cases of n = 0 and n =  1, respectively, that the
absence of second chances causes a substantial loss of economic welfare by
discouraging all jobless workers from preserving their employability. Unless
13Nevertheless, we should note that the decrease in n may reduce WS for some values
of F . As shown in Table 10, the decrease in n from  1 to  2 reduces WS if F ranges
from 0:850 to 0:922, and the decrease in n from  2 to  3 also reduces WS if F equals
either 0:860 or 0:870. In these cases, the increment of labor income is dominated by that
of eort expenditure, which causes the observed reduction in WS.
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Table 13: Changes in Workers' Surplus
n
0
F w NSCE SCE  1  2  3  4  5  10  20  30  1
0.840 (F1) 1 0 5.21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.850 0.992  0:50 4.71 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
0.860 0.984  1:00 4.21 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
0.870 0.976  1:49 3.72 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 NA
0.880 0.968  1:99 3.22 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 NA NA
0.890 0.960  2:48 2.73 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 NA NA NA
0.900 0.952  2:96 2.25 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 NA NA NA
0.911 0.944  3:45 1.76 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 NA NA NA NA
0.922 0.937  3:93 1.28 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 NA NA NA NA
0.932 0.929  4:41 0.80 0.25 0.23 0.23 NA NA NA NA NA NA
0.943 (F3) 0.921  4:89 0.32 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1 0.883  6:70  1:49 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2 0.495  45:86  40:65 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Note: The smallest possible changes are reported when (F; n) = (F3; 0).
Table 14: Changes in Investors' Surplus
n
0
F w NSCE SCE  1  2  3  4  5  10  20  30  1
0.840 (F1) 1 0 7.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.850 0.992 0.04 7.01 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.860 0.984 0.08 7.01 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
0.870 0.976 0.13 7.02 0.21 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 NA
0.880 0.968 0.17 7.02 0.31 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 NA NA
0.890 0.960 0.21 7.03 0.42 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 NA NA NA
0.900 0.952 0.25 7.03 0.57 0.16 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 NA NA NA
0.911 0.944 0.29 7.04 0.77 0.21 0.10 0.09 0.09 NA NA NA NA
0.922 0.937 0.33 7.04 1.04 0.27 0.12 0.11 0.11 NA NA NA NA
0.932 0.929 0.37 7.05 1.44 0.33 0.15 NA NA NA NA NA NA
0.943 (F3) 0.921 0.41 7.05 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1 0.883 6.10 12.57 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2 0.495 4.64 9.34 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Note: The smallest possible changes are reported when (F; n) = (F3; 0).
the entry cost is so high that no stationary equilibrium but the NSCE can
exist in this economy, the government should make every eort to persuade
rms not to hold the extreme view that all jobless workers have already lost
their employability. This would create second chances for those who have
been unemployed for a relatively short span of time and would lead to an
extensive improvement in the aggregate employment. As shown in Figures 2
and 3, the aggregate employment cannot be larger than 0.436 when second
chances are absent, that is, n = 0, but it never falls below 0.820 when these
chances are present, that is, n < 0.
Second, if the entry cost takes such a value that multiple SCEs can exist
in this economy, taxing jobless workers may lead to an improvement in eco-
nomic welfare in the sense that it enhances both WS and IS. When the value
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Table 15: Changes in Total Surplus
n
0
F w NSCE SCE  1  2  3  4  5  10  20  30  1
0.840 (F1) 1 0 12.21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.850 0.992  0:46 11.72 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
0.860 0.984  0:91 11.22 0.16 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
0.870 0.976  1:37 10.73 0.26 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 NA
0.880 0.968  1:82 10.25 0.38 0.19 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 NA NA
0.890 0.960  2:27 9.76 0.52 0.24 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19 NA NA NA
0.900 0.952  2:72 9.28 0.70 0.31 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.23 NA NA NA
0.911 0.944  3:16 8.80 0.93 0.38 0.28 0.27 0.27 NA NA NA NA
0.922 0.937  3:60 8.32 1.24 0.47 0.33 0.31 0.31 NA NA NA NA
0.932 0.929  4:04 7.84 1.69 0.57 0.37 NA NA NA NA NA NA
0.943 (F3) 0.921  4:48 7.37 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1 0.883  0:59 11.09 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2 0.495  41:22  31:30 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Note: The smallest possible changes are reported when (F; n) = (F3; 0).
of w is reduced by taxation, workers are more drawn to the status of em-
ployment, which enables rms to motivate their employees by paying lower
wages than before. This, in turn, shifts the proles of the AICs downward.
If w is reduced to such a level that the proles of the AICs for n < 0 can
intersect with that of the aggregate labor demand at the upper end of their
upward-sloping parts, then, possible stationary equilibria are restricted to
one SCE and one NSCE, which we call the \new SCE" and the \new NSCE,"
respectively. In the new SCE, E and w^ are determined as E = E and
w^ = w = w, and, regardless of rms' belief, jobless workers can nd new
jobs by experiencing only one period of unemployment. In the new NSCE,
E and w^ are determined as E = E and w^ = w = w. Since the new
SCE attains the maximum employment, it is quite natural to guess that the
government can enhance both WS and IS by guiding the economy from the
current equilibrium to the new SCE.
Tables 13{15 report the results of a numerical experiment conducted to
judge the validity of this guess, with all eects evaluated under the parameter
conguration of Table 1.14 There are thirteen columns in each table; the rst
lists the values of F , all of which, except for F1, give rise to either multiple
or no SCEs before w is reduced; the second reports the maximal value of w
that can support the new SCE for a given value of F ; the third reports the
surplus gains from moving the economy from the old NSCE, which exists
before w is reduced, to the new NSCE; the fourth reports the surplus gains
from moving the economy from the old NSCE to the new SCE; and the fth
to thirteenth report the surplus gains from moving the economy from an old
SCE, which exists before w is reduced, to the new one. The case in which
F = F1 serves as a benchmark, since in this case, the prole of the aggregate
14For the details of the derivation, see Appendix E.
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labor demand runs through the upper end of the upward-sloping parts of
the AICs for n < 0, although w is not reduced. When F 2 (F1; F3), the
reduction in w coalesces the multiple old SCEs into the new one, in which E
is increased to E, UO is decreased to zero, but the levels of w1 and w2+,
and thus, that of ~w remain unchanged. It also creates the new NSCE, in
which E, UO, and w^ take the same values as in the old one, but w
1 and w2+
have changed their values in such a manner that ~w is reduced. As shown
in Tables 13{15, the resulting changes in WS, IS, and TS are positive if
the economy moves to the new SCE, implying that in these cases, guiding
the economy from the current equilibrium to the new SCE surely improves
economic welfare. When F = F3, the reduction in w coalesces the multiple
NSCEs into the one with E = E and w2+ < ~w < w^ = w = w < w1
while creating from scratch the new SCE with E = E and w2+ = ~w =
w^ = w = w = w1. Again, in this case, guiding the economy from an old
NSCE to the new SCE improves economic welfare, as implied by Tables 13{
15. When F > F3, the situation changes drastically. Before w is reduced,
there is a single NSCE, in which no production occurs, and the reduction
in w restarts production activities in the economy by creating the new SCE
and the new NSCE, in both of which a positive population of workers is
hired. However, this does not lead to an improvement in economic welfare
since it decreases WS even if the economy is guided to the new SCE, as
shown in Table 13. In these cases, rms need to pay low wages to their
employees to generate prot ows that are large enough to compensate for
a large entry cost. Such low wages signicantly erode the attraction of
employment and completely eliminate the incentive of workers to expend
eorts unless w is substantially reduced. Put another way, when the entry
cost is substantially large, the reduction in w eectively curtails workers'
income-earning opportunities other than employment, thereby forcing them
to work for low wages. As shown in Table 13, when F is as large as two, it
decreases TS even if the economy is guided to the new SCE, which implies
that production activities are no longer socially desirable. To sum up this
argument, taxing jobless workers can improve economic welfare only when
the entry cost takes such an intermediate value that multiple SCEs can exist
in this economy. When the entry cost is substantially large, such taxation
makes only investors better o at the expense of workers' welfare.
6 Conclusion
This paper has examined the long-run consequences of ranking job appli-
cants by their unemployment durations by using a simple general equilibrium
model with eciency wages, in which the statistical discrimination of rms
against jobless workers has a distorting eect on labor market performance.
When the cost of establishing a new rm takes an intermediate value, the
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model exhibits multiple stationary equilibria, which dier from one another
in allocative eciency, and the most inecient one is realized by the belief
of rms that jobless workers have already lost their employability. Thus
the government should persuade rms not to hold such an extreme belief,
thereby creating second chances for jobless workers. Moreover, if the gov-
ernment can reduce the incomes of jobless workers through taxation, the
multiple equilibria, in which a subset of jobless workers are given second
chances, are coalesced into a more ecient one, in which every job seeker
can nd a new job by experiencing one period of unemployment. These
policies eectively nullify the distorting eect of statistical discrimination
considered here.
Appendix A: Proofs (Not for Publication)
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Let V (n;Q) denote the lifetime utility of a worker in the labor force
whose current state is (n;Q). If the path of wages paid to an employed
worker is optimally chosen, then she nds it optimal to expend work eort
in every period, and thus, for 8n  1, the following relations hold true:
V (n; 1) = wn   e+ 1  
1 + r
[(1  b)V (n+ 1; 1) + bV ( 1; 1)]
 wn + 1  
1 + r

(1  b)(1  q)V (n+ 1; 1)
+(b+ q   bq)V ( 1; 1)

:
(6)
The larger side of (6) measures the lifetime utility when this worker expends
e units of work eort in the nth period. If she makes this choice, then, in
the next period, she will either keep this job with probability 1   b, in
which case her lifetime utility changes from V (n; 1) to V (n + 1; 1), or lose
it with probability b, in which case her lifetime utility changes from V (n; 1)
to V ( 1; 1). The smaller side, on the other hand, measures the lifetime
utility when this agent expends zero eort in the nth period. If she makes
this choice, then, in the next period, she will either keep this job with
probability (1   b)(1   q), in which case her lifetime utility changes from
V (n; 1) to V (n + 1; 1), or lose it with probability b + q   bq, in which case
her lifetime utility changes from V (n; 1) to V ( 1; 1). By rearranging both
sides of (6), we can obtain
8n  1; V (n+ 1; 1)  V ( 1; 1) + 1 + r
(1  )(1  b)q e: (7)
The rm sets wages paid in and after the second period of service at such
a level that the equalities of (7) hold true, thereby minimizing labor costs.
Because workers are not allowed to hop directly from one rm to another,
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the rm has no incentive to pay employees recruited in or before the previous
period higher wages than those necessary to elicit their work eorts. Using
the equalities of (7) to eliminate V (n; 1) and V (n + 1; 1) from (6), we can
obtain
8n  2; wn = r + 
1 + r
V ( 1; 1) + 1 + r   (1  )(1  b)(1  q)
(1  )(1  b)q e = w
2+: (8)
To elicit work eorts from newly recruited workers or, equivalently, to con-
vince them that their labor contracts will be renewed at the end of the rst
period of service, the starting wage, w1, cannot be lower than those paid in
and after the second period of service, w2+. When w1  w2+, the workers
are convinced that unless they shirk, their contracts will be renewed since
their wages decrease from w1 to w2+ in the next period, which gives their
rm a strong incentive to continue the employment relationship with them.
When w1 < w2+, in contrast, the workers are so skeptical about the renewal
of their contracts that they choose to expend zero eort. If new workers
can be recruited at a starting wage that is lower than w2+, the rm nds it
protable to terminate its contracts with the current employees, replacing
them with new ones and, thereby, saving labor costs. From the viewpoint
of newly recruited workers, however, the starting wage lower than w2+ is an
informal notice that their contracts will terminate at the end of the rst pe-
riod of service. Thus, if such a low starting wage is oered, they will choose
to expend zero eorts while receiving that wage, which is paid independent
of their eort expenditure. We must also note that the cost minimization
of the rm cannot preclude the possibility of w1 > w2+. Unlike employed
workers, job applicants can apply to multiple job openings, which makes
it possible for starting wages to take a larger value than w2+. When the
aggregate demand for labor is suciently large, rms may not hire a desired
number of new workers without making the level of w1 higher than w2+.
Proof of Lemma 1
Consider a rm established in period t, and let Lnt+s be the number of its
employees who complete the nth period of service in period t+s. Obviously,
Lt+s and fLnt+sgsn=1 satisfy
Lt+s =
sX
n=1
Lnt+s: (9)
As shown in Proposition 1, if the rm sets the wage levels for the newly
recruited and other employed workers at w1 and w2+, respectively, then, all
employees expend work eorts. Hence, the expected prots of this rm can
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be written as
1X
s=1

1  b
1 + r
s 1 " sX
n=1
Lnt+s
!
 
sX
n=1
wnLnt+s
#
= Lt+1   w1Lt+1
+
1X
s=2

1  b
1 + r
s 1 " sX
n=1
Lnt+s
!
  w1L1t+s   w2+
sX
n=2
Lnt+s
#
= Lt+1   w1Lt+1
+
1X
s=2

1  b
1 + r
s 1
Lt+s   w2+(1  )Lt+s 1
 w1[Lt+s   (1  )Lt+s 1]

;
(10)
the rst equality of which is obtained from the fact that wn = w2+ for
8n  2, and the second from (9) and the fact that only a fraction (1  ) of
current employees survive into the next period:
8t; 8s  1; 8n = 1; : : : ; s; Ln+1t+s+1 = (1  )Lnt+s:
If fLt+sg1s=1 is chosen to maximize (10), then
8t; 8s  1; L 1t+s = w1  
(1  b)(1  )(w1   w2+)
1 + r
;
which implies our desired result.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 jointly imply that the net gain can be rewritten
as
 F + 1
1 + r
1X
s=1

1  b
1 + r
s 1 
~Lt+s  wt+s  Lt+s

=  F + zL
   w1L
1 + r
+
1X
s=2

1  b
1 + r
s 1 L   [w1 + (1  )w2+]L
1 + r
=  F + zL
   w1L
1 + r
+
1  b
r + b
 L
   [w1 + (1  )w2+]L
1 + r
=  F + 1
r + b

L   w1L+ (1  )(1  b)(w
1   w2+)
1 + r
L

=  F + L
   w^L
r + b
;
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the second line of which is obtained from the assertions of Proposition 1 and
Lemma 1 that every rm sets the wage for the employees in the nth period
of service at a constant level as in (8); that such a wage prole induces
employees to expend work eorts, thereby making each rm's eective labor
input coincide with its total number of employees, ~Lt+s = Lt+s; and that
each rm keeps its total number of employees constant over time, Lt+s = L.
Also note that the last line of this equation is obtained from the denition
of w^, (3). Thus, if the net gain equals zero, the following must hold:
 F + (L   w^L)=(r + b) = 0: (11)
By solving (3) and (11) with respect to w^ and L, we can obtain our desired
results.
Proof of Proposition 2
Let m and L denote, respectively, the number of rms operating in such an
equilibrium and the number of employees each rm hires. Then, m, L, E,
and w^ satisfy (3),
mL = E;
and
 F + (L   w^L)=(r + b)  0: (12)
Condition (12) means that the net gain from setting up a new rm cannot
be positive in equilibrium. To see why, suppose that the net gain is positive,
 F + (L   w^L)=(r + b) > 0;
which, combined with (3), implies that
w^   w < 0: (13)
Because the number of rms is increasing as long as the net gain is positive,
there are innitely many rms operating in equilibrium, m = +1. We
must also note that the aggregate employment (i.e., E) takes a nite value
since the number of workers in the labor force equals N in any period.
These jointly suggest that the number of employees chosen by each operating
rm must be innitesimally small, L = 0. According to (3), rms nd it
optimal to select such a small employment size if and only if w^ = +1,
which obviously contradicts (13). Thus, we can safely say that (12), and
thus, w^   w  0, are true in equilibrium. When the equality of (12) is
valid, operating rms set their levels of w^ and L as in (4), as already shown
in Lemma 2. On the other hand, their number cannot be determined since
any non-negative value of m is consistent with investors' rational decisions.
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Thus, in this case, E can take any non-negative value. When the inequality
of (12) is valid, conditions (3) and (12) jointly imply that rms would set
the level of w^ as w^ w > 0 if they were operating in equilibrium. However,
in equilibrium, no rm is established because m = 0, and thus, E must be
equal to zero.
Appendix B: Derivation of Aggregate Incentive Con-
straints (Not for Publication)
When n = 0 and n =  1, equilibrium conditions are so simple that we
can analytically derive the proles of the AIC for these cases. When n 2
( 1; 0), equilibrium conditions are so complicated that we must resort to
a numerical method to derive the proles of the AIC for these cases.
AIC for n = 0
Let us begin by deriving the AIC for the case of n = 0. This case is special in
that rms' belief is unconditionally self-fullling. Specically, rms strongly
believe that jobless workers have already lost their employability, disqualify-
ing currently jobless workers for employment and thereby nullifying the risk
of hiring an unemployable worker. In response to this hiring policy, jobless
workers stop maintaining their employability, which completely fullls rms'
belief.
Lemma 3. Suppose that there is a stationary equilibrium with n = 0. Then,
in that equilibrium, (a) jobless workers, who have negative values of n, ex-
pend zero eort, and their lifetime utilities are determined as
8n   1; 8Q = 0; 1; V (n;Q) = [(1 + r)=(r + )]w;
and (b) the level of w2+ is determined as
w2+ = w +
1 + r   (1  )(1  b)(1  q)
(1  )(1  b)q e ( w
): (14)
Proof. When n = 0, job openings are limited to newly born workers in each
period, and thus the lifetime utility of a worker unemployed at the beginning
of period t can be written as
1X
s=0

1  
1 + r
s
(w   et+s):
Obviously, this utility attains its maximum, [(1 + r)=(r + )]w, at et+s = 0
for 8s  0, which establishes part (a). Part (a) implies that in this case,
V ( 1; 1) = [(1 + r)=(r + )]w: (15)
Substituting (15) into (2) produces (14).
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Because every worker dies with probability , and because every job is
destroyed and re-created with probability b, there are [(+ b b)=(1 )]E
job openings in each period.15 When rms ll their vacancies exclusively
with new entrants into the labor force, then, the following must hold:
a[=(1  )]N = [( + b  b)=(1  )]E; (16)
where a 2 [0; 1] denotes the job nding rate for workers believed to be
employable, who are the new entrants in this case. The value of a is not
exogenously given, but endogenously determined in equilibrium.
Proposition 3 (AIC for n = 0). Suppose that there is a stationary equilib-
rium with n = 0, and let E, w^, and w represent the aggregate employment,
the average wage dened by (3), and the constant dened by (14), respec-
tively. Moreover, dene E as
E  [=( + b  b)]N:
Then, in that equilibrium, E and w^ satisfy
(E   E)(w^   w) = 0; (17)
E   E  0 (18)
and
w^   w  0: (19)
Proof. When the aggregate labor demand is so large that all newly born
workers can nd jobs, a = 1, their starting wages w1 and the aggregate
employment E must satisfy
E = [=( + b  b)]N( E); w1  w; (20)
where w is as dened in (14). When the aggregate labor demand is not
large enough to ensure jobs for all newly born workers, a < 1, the starting
wages and the aggregate employment must satisfy
E < E; w1 = w: (21)
Conditions (20) and (21) can be merged as
(E   E)(w1   w) = 0;
E   E  0;
w1   w  0;
which are equivalent to (17)-(19) since the sign of w1 w always coincides
with that of w^   w.
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Figure 8: AIC for n = 0
Figure 8 depicts the AIC for n = 0. As shown in that gure, when rms
embrace the belief of n = 0, it is impossible to attain a level of aggregate
employment that is larger than E. Under this belief, all vacant positions
must be lled with new entrants, which necessitates that the aggregate em-
ployment be no larger than E. When E = E, the labor market is so
tight that all newly born workers can nd a job, a = 1, and thus, wages
satisfy
w1  w^  w2+ = w:
When E < E, the labor market is so loose that some of the newly born
workers cannot nd a job, a < 1, and thus, wages satisfy
w1 = w2+ = w^ = w:
AIC for n =  1
When n =  1, rms do not care about an applicant's record of unem-
ployment because they believe that unemployed workers retain their em-
ployability. However, this belief is not sucient to ensure the employability
of unemployed workers. Even when rms share such a belief, unemployed
workers may nd it optimal to stop preserving their employability if they
15Note that the total number of job openings is larger than that of the vacancies that are
expected to appear, (+b b)E. This is because rms recruit extra workers, anticipating
that a fraction  of their recruited workers die at the end of the current period.
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expect to experience a suciently long duration of unemployment before
being rehired or if they expect to receive suciently low wages after being
rehired. Put another way, some additional conditions must be met for the
self-fulllment of rms' belief.
Lemma 4. Suppose that there is a stationary equilibrium with n =  1.
Then, in that equilibrium, (a) the following conditions must hold:
8n   1; w   e+ 1  
1 + r
[aV (1; 1) + (1  a)V (n  1; 1)]
 w + 1  
1 + r
[a(1  q)V (1; 0) + (1  a+ aq)V (n  1; 0)];
(22)
and (b) the lifetime utilities of employed and unemployed workers are deter-
mined as
V (n;Q) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
VDU if n   1 and Q = 0
V 1DE if n = 1 and Q = 0
VDE if n  2 and Q = 0
VU if n   1 and Q = 1
V 1E if n = 1 and Q = 1
VE if n  2 and Q = 1
;
where the values of VDU , V
1
DE, VDE, VU , V
1
E, and VE are given by
VDU = w +
1  
1 + r

a(1  q)V 1DE + (1  a+ aq)VDU

; (23)
V 1DE = w
1 +
1  
1 + r
[(1  b)(1  q)VDE + (b+ q   bq)VDU ] ; (24)
VDE = w
2+ +
1  
1 + r
[(1  b)(1  q)VDE + (b+ q   bq)VDU ] ; (25)
VU = w   e+ 1  
1 + r

aV 1E + (1  a)VU

; (26)
V 1E = w
1   e+ 1  
1 + r
[(1  b)VE + bVU ] ; (27)
and
VE = w
2+   e+ 1  
1 + r
[(1  b)VE + bVU ] : (28)
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Proof. Part (a): Consider an employable worker who is currently experi-
encing her  nth period of unemployment. If this worker preserves her em-
ployability in the current period, then at the end of that period, she will
either be hired by a rm with probability a, in which case her lifetime utility
evaluated at the beginning of the next period is given by V (1; 1), or remain
unemployed with probability 1   a, in which case her lifetime utility eval-
uated at the beginning of the next period is given by V (n   1; 1). Thus,
in this case, her lifetime utility evaluated at the beginning of the current
period can be expressed as
w   e+ 1  
1 + r
[aV (1; 1) + (1  a)V (n  1; 1)] : (29)
If this worker stops preserving her employability in the current period, then
at the end of that period, she will either be hired by a rm with probability
a(1   q), in which case her lifetime utility evaluated at the beginning of
the next period is given by V (1; 0), or remain unemployed with probability
1 a+aq, in which case her lifetime utility evaluated at the beginning of the
next period is given by V (n   1; 0). Thus, in this case, her lifetime utility
evaluated at the beginning of the current period can be expressed as
w +
1  
1 + r
[a(1  q)V (1; 0) + (1  a+ aq)V (n  1; 0)] : (30)
The worker nds it optimal to preserve her employability if and only if the
value of (29) is no smaller than that of (30). Therefore, (22) is necessary for
the existence of a stationary equilibrium with n =  1.
Part (b): When n =  1, the lifetime utilities of workers who have
already lost their employability satisfy
8n   1; V (n; 0) = w + 1  
1 + r

a(1  q)V (1; 0)
+(1  a+ aq)V (n  1; 0)

; (31)
V (1; 0) = w1 +
1  
1 + r

(1  b)(1  q)V (2; 0)
+(b+ q   bq)V ( 1; 0)

; (32)
and
8n  2; V (n; 0) = w2+ + 1  
1 + r

(1  b)(1  q)V (n+ 1; 0)
+(b+ q   bq)V ( 1; 0)

: (33)
To understand why these conditions hold, consider an unemployable worker
who is currently experiencing her  nth period of unemployment. At the
end of the current period, she will either be hired by a rm with probability
a(1   q), in which case her lifetime utility changes from V (n; 0) to V (1; 0),
or remain unemployed with probability 1   a + aq, in which case her life-
time utility changes from V (n; 0) to V (n  1; 0). Alternatively, consider an
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unemployable worker who is experiencing her nth period of service with her
current rm. Her employment will either continue into the next period with
probability (1   b)(1   q), in which case her lifetime utility changes from
V (n; 0) to V (n + 1; 0), or terminate at the end of the current period with
probability b+ q  bq, in which case her lifetime utility changes from V (n; 0)
to V ( 1; 0). Condition (31) implies that V (n; 0) takes a constant value,
8n   1; V (n; 0) = V (n  1; 0):
Otherwise, it diverges toward either positive or negative innity as n ap-
proaches negative innity. Likewise, condition (33) implies that V (n; 0)
takes a constant value,
8n  2; V (n; 0) = V (n+ 1; 0):
Otherwise, it diverges toward either positive or negative innity as n ap-
proaches positive innity. These results allow us to rewrite (31){(33) as
(23){(25). Next, consider the workers who are still employable. Their life-
time utilities satisfy
8n   1; V (n; 1) = w   e+ 1  
1 + r

aV (1; 1)
+(1  a)V (n  1; 1)

; (34)
V (1; 1) = w1   e+ 1  
1 + r

(1  b)V (2; 1)
+bV ( 1; 1)

; (35)
and
8n  2; V (n; 1) = w2+   e+ 1  
1 + r

(1  b)V (n+ 1; 1)
+bV ( 1; 1)

: (36)
To understand why these conditions hold, consider an employable worker
who is currently experiencing her  nth period of unemployment. Since (22)
is true, this worker nds it optimal to expend e units of eort to preserve
her employability in the current period. At the end of that period, she will
either be hired by a rm with probability a, in which case her lifetime utility
changes from V (n; 1) to V (1; 1), or remain unemployed with probability
1  a, in which case her lifetime utility changes from V (n; 1) to V (n  1; 1).
Alternatively, consider an employable worker who is experiencing her nth
period of service with her current rm. As shown in Lemma 1, the wage
prole is optimally designed such that this worker chooses to expend e units
of work eort in the current period. Her employment will either continue
into the next period with probability 1  b, in which case her lifetime utility
changes from V (n; 1) to V (n+ 1; 1), or terminate at the end of the current
period with probability b, in which case her lifetime utility changes from
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V (n; 1) to V ( 1; 1). Condition (34) implies that V (n; 1) takes a constant
value,
8n   1; V (n; 1) = V (n  1; 1):
Otherwise, it diverges toward either positive or negative innity as n ap-
proaches negative innity. Likewise, condition (36) implies that V (n; 1)
takes a constant value,
8n  2; V (n; 1) = V (n+ 1; 1):
Otherwise, it diverges toward either positive or negative innity as n ap-
proaches positive innity. These results allow us to rewrite (34){(36) as
(26){(28).
As shown in this lemma, all of the unemployed workers choose to pre-
serve their employability if and only if condition (22) is true. Otherwise,
some unemployed workers stop preserving their employability, which makes
it dicult for rms to embrace the belief that all of the unemployed workers
are still employable. We call (22) the employability preserving condition
(EPC) for n =  1.
Because both new entrants and currently unemployed workers are be-
lieved to be employable in this case, the total number of job seekers is given
by [=(1  )]N +N  E, whereas [(+ b  b)=(1  )]E jobs become open
in each period, as in the case of n = 0. Thus, in equilibrium, the following
must hold:
af[=(1  )]N +N  Eg = [( + b  b)=(1  )]E: (37)
Then we can state the following.
Proposition 4 (AIC for n =  1). Suppose that there is a stationary
equilibrium with n =  1. Then, in that equilibrium, E and w^ must satisfy
w^   w  

r +  + (1  )b
(1  )(1  b)q +
 + b  b
(1  b)q 
E
N   (1  )E

e



1
1 + b  bN   E

= 0;
(38)
w^   w  

r +  + (1  )b
(1  )(1  b)q +
 + b  b
(1  b)q 
E
N   (1  )E

e  0; (39)
1
1 + b  bN   E  0; (40)
and
E   (1  b)N  0: (41)
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Proof. From (23){(28), we can derive VDU and VU as
VDU =
1 + r
(r + )[1 + r   (1  )(1  q)(1  a  b)]

8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
[1 + r   (1  )(1  q)(1  b)]w
+
(1  )(1  q)a[1 + r   (1  )(1  q)(1  b)]
1 + r   (1  )(1  b) w^
 (1  )
2(1  q)qa(1  b)
1 + r   (1  )(1  b) w
2+
9>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>;
(42)
and
VU =
(1 + r)[1 + r   (1  )(1  b)]
(r + )[1 + r   (1  )(1  a  b)] (w   e)
+
(1 + r)(1  )a
(r + )[1 + r   (1  )(1  a  b)] (w^   e):
(43)
Lemma 4 implies that (22) can be rewritten as VU  VDU . Thus, by substi-
tuting the values of VDU and VU into this inequality, we can obtain another
expression of the EPC:
[1 + r   (1  )(1  b)]w + (1  )aw^
1 + r   (1  )(1  a  b)   e
 [1 + r   (1  )(1  q)(1  a  b)] 1

8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
[1 + r   (1  )(1  q)(1  b)]w
+
(1  )(1  q)a[1 + r   (1  )(1  q)(1  b)]
1 + r   (1  )(1  b) w^
 (1  )
2(1  q)qa(1  b)
1 + r   (1  )(1  b) w
2+
9>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>;
:
(44)
Next, we will derive the relation between w^ and a implied by rms' optimal
wage setting behavior. According to Lemma 1, rms set the wages paid in
and after the second period of service as
w2+ =
r + 
1 + r
VU +
1 + r   (1  )(1  b)(1  q)
(1  )(1  b)q e
=
[1 + r   (1  )(1  b)]w + (1  )aw^
1 + r   (1  )(1  a  b)
+
1 + r   (1  )(1  b)
(1  )(1  b)q e;
(45)
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the second equality of which is obtained from (43). As is easily veried,
condition (37) can be reduced to
a =
( + b  b)E
N   (1  )E : (46)
When a = 1, this condition can be further reduced to
E = [1=(1 + b  b)]N:
In this case, the labor market is so tight that rms may not hire their desired
number of new employees without making starting wages higher than those
paid in and after the second period of service,
w2+  w^  w1;
which, combined with (45), implies that
w^  w + 1 + r + (1  )b
(1  )(1  b)q e: (47)
When a < 1, condition (46) implies that
E < [1=(1 + b  b)]N:
In this case, the labor market is so loose that rms can hire their desired
number of new employees by setting starting wages at the same level as
those paid in and after the second period of service,
w1 = w2+ = w^; (48)
which, combined with (45), implies that
w^ = w +
1 + r   (1  )(1  a  b)
(1  )(1  b)q e: (49)
These results are summarized by
w^   w   1 + r   (1  )(1  a  b)
(1  )(1  b)q e

 (1  a) = 0; (50)
w^   w   1 + r   (1  )(1  a  b)
(1  )(1  b)q e  0; (51)
and
1  a  0: (52)
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We also need to examine whether optimal wages satisfy the EPC. When
a = 1, the EPC, that is, (44), is reduced to
[1 + r   (1  )(1  b)]w + (1  )w^
1 + r + (1  )b   e
 [1 + r + (1  )(1  q)b] 1

8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
[1 + r   (1  )(1  q)(1  b)]w
+
(1  )(1  q)[1 + r   (1  )(1  q)(1  b)]
1 + r   (1  )(1  b) w^
 (1  )
2(1  q)q(1  b)
1 + r   (1  )(1  b) w
2+
9>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>;
:
(53)
Using (45) to eliminate w2+ from (53), we can obtain a simplied version of
the EPC,
w^   w  1 + r + (1  )b
(1  )q e: (54)
This condition is true for any value of w^ implied by optimal wage setting
behavior since such a value satises (47). When a < 1, condition (48) is
true, and thus, the EPC, that is, (44), is reduced to
w^   w 
[1 + r   (1  )(1  a  b)][1 + r   (1  q)(1  )(1  a  b)]
(1 + r)(1  )aq e:
(55)
In addition, w^ satises (49) in this case. Using (49) to eliminate w^ w from
(55) and rearranging it, we can obtain
a  1  b; (56)
which is the necessary and sucient condition for a value of w^ implied by
optimal wage setting behavior to satisfy the EPC. Finally, using (46), we
can rewrite (50){(52) and (56) as (38){(41).
Figure 9 depicts the AIC for n =  1 as well as that for n = 0.16
16This gure is depicted under the condition that  < (1  )(1  b). If this condition is
not met, the AICs for n = 0 and n =  1 have one intersection, creating the possibility
that the aggregate employment attained under the belief that all unemployed workers are
unemployable dominates that attained under the belief that they are employable. This
possibility need not be seriously considered because its realization requires either b or 
to take an unrealistically high value. Because labor contracts are renewed every period in
our model, the length of one period should be considered to be one year or shorter, and
thus, it is reasonable to assume that both b and  are smaller than 0.1, which suces to
make the above condition true.
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1 + b−ǰb N
wˆ
(1− b)N
w +
1 + r − (1−ǰ)(1− b)
(1−ǰ)(1− b)q e
w +
1 + r
(1−ǰ)(1− b)q e w∗∗
w +
1 + r + (1− θ)b
(1− θ)(1− b)q
e
ǰ
ǰ+ b−ǰb N
n¯ = 0 n¯ = −∞
Figure 9: AICs for n = 0 and n =  1
As shown in that gure, the AIC for n =  1 has vertical and upward-
sloping parts. On the vertical part, the labor market is so tight that all
job seekers can nd a job, a = 1, and thus wages satisfy w1  w^  w2.
On the upward-sloping part, the labor market is so loose that some job
seekers cannot nd a job, a < 1, and thus, wages satisfy w1 = w2 = w^.
The AIC for this case has an upward-sloping part rather than a horizontal
one because it provides unemployed workers with second chances. In the
presence of second chances, the level of wages required to elicit work eorts
from employed workers increases with the aggregate employment. As the
aggregate employment increases, the probability that an unemployed worker
will be rehired improves, which eectively eases the penalty for shirking
behavior by currently employed workers. To keep their employees from
shirking, rms need to pay higher wages, thereby rendering the loss of their
current job suciently costly to them. Also note that the wages that are
set so as to discipline employees can also motivate unemployed workers if
and only if the aggregate employment is no smaller than (1  b)N . In other
cases, some unemployed workers stop preserving their employability, either
because their prospects of being rehired are slim or because the wages they
will receive after reemployment are too low. This is why the AIC for this
case cannot be obtained when the aggregate employment is smaller than
(1  b)N .
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AIC for n 2 ( 1; 0)
When n < 0, the jobless workers whose unemployment durations are n
periods or shorter are given \second chances," that is, chances of being
rehired. The AIC for such a negative value of n requires not only that all of
the employed workers spend work eorts, but also that the jobless workers
who are given second chances preserve their employability (whereas other
jobless ones stop preserving their employability).
Lemma 5. Suppose that there is a stationary equilibrium with n < 0, and
let a be the job-nding rate for the jobless workers who are believed by rms
to be employable. Then, in that equilibrium, (a) the following conditions
must hold:
8n 2 [n; 1]; w   e+ 1  
1 + r
[aV (1; 1) + (1  a)V (n  1; 1)]
 w + 1  
1 + r
[a(1  q)V (1; 0) + (1  a+ aq)V (n  1; 0)];
(57)
and (b) the lifetime utilities of employed and jobless workers are determined
as
V (n;Q) =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
VO if n  n  1
V nDU if n 2 [n; 1] and Q = 0
V 1DE if n = 1 and Q = 0
VDE if n  2 and Q = 0
V nU if n 2 [n; 1] and Q = 1
V 1E if n = 1 and Q = 1
VE if n  2 and Q = 1
;
where the values of VO, V
n
DU , V
1
DE, VDE, V
n
U , V
1
E, and VE are given by
VO = w +
1  
1 + r
VO; (58)
V nDU = w +
1  
1 + r

a(1  q)V 1DE + (1  a+ aq)VO

; (59)
V 1DE = w
1 +
1  
1 + r

(1  b)(1  q)VDE + (b+ q   bq)V  1DU

; (60)
VDE = w
2+ +
1  
1 + r

(1  b)(1  q)VDE + (b+ q   bq)V  1DU

; (61)
V nU = w   e+
1  
1 + r

aV 1E + (1  a)VO

; (62)
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V 1E = w
1   e+ 1  
1 + r

(1  b)VE + bV  1U

; (63)
VE = w
2+   e+ 1  
1 + r

(1  b)VE + bV  1U

; (64)
and if n   2, then, for n = n+ 1;    ; 1,
V nDU = w +
1  
1 + r

a(1  q)V 1DE + (1  a+ aq)V n 1DU

; (65)
V nU = w   e+
1  
1 + r

aV 1E + (1  a)V n 1U

: (66)
Proof. Part (a): Note that condition (57) is the same as condition (22),
except that the former must be satised for 8n 2 [n; 1], whereas the latter
for 8n 2 ( 1; 1]. As already explained in the proof of Lemma 4, the
larger side of (57) measures the lifetime utility of an employable worker who
is currently experiencing her  nth period of unemployment in the case that
she chooses to preserve her employability in the current period, whereas
the smaller side measures her lifetime utility in the case that she chooses
to stop preserving her employability. If condition (57) is not met for some
n 2 [n; 1], then, those who have been unemployed for  n periods nd
it optimal to stop preserving their employability, which contradicts rms'
belief. Therefore, condition (57) is necessary for the existence of a stationary
equilibrium with n 2 ( 1; 0).
Part (b): When n 2 ( 1; 0), those who have been unemployed for more
than  n periods will never be rehired, and thus, their lifetime utilities are
determined as
8n  n  1; 8Q = 0; 1; V (n;Q) = [(1 + r)=(r + )]w ( VO): (67)
The lifetime utilities of unemployable workers with n  n (n 6= 0) satisfy
8n 2 [n; 1]; V (n; 0) = w + 1  
1 + r

a(1  q)V (1; 0)
+(1  a+ aq)V (n  1; 0)

; (68)
V (1; 0) = w1 +
1  
1 + r

(1  b)(1  q)V (2; 0)
+(b+ q   bq)V ( 1; 0)

; (69)
and
8n  2; V (n; 0) = w2+ + 1  
1 + r

(1  b)(1  q)V (n+ 1; 0)
+(b+ q   bq)V ( 1; 0)

: (70)
Condition (70) implies that V (n; 0) takes a constant value,
8n  2; V (n; 0) = V (n+ 1; 0):
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Otherwise, it diverges toward either positive or negative innity as n ap-
proaches positive innity. These results allow us to rewrite (68){(70) as
(59){(61) and (65). Next, consider the workers who are still employable.
When unemployed, such a worker nds it optimal to expend e units of ef-
fort to preserve her employability since (57) is true. When employed, such a
worker nds it optimal to expend e units of work eort since the wage prole
is designed as shown in Lemma 1. Thus, their lifetime utilities satisfy
8n 2 [n; 1]; V (n; 1) = w   e+ 1  
1 + r

aV (1; 1)
+(1  a)V (n  1; 1)

; (71)
V (1; 1) = w1   e+ 1  
1 + r

(1  b)V (2; 1)
+bV ( 1; 1)

; (72)
and
8n  2; V (n; 1) = w2+   e+ 1  
1 + r

(1  b)V (n+ 1; 1)
+bV ( 1; 1)

: (73)
Condition (73) implies that V (n; 1) takes a constant value,
8n  2; V (n; 1) = V (n+ 1; 1):
Otherwise, it diverges toward either positive or negative innity as n ap-
proaches positive innity. These results allow us to rewrite (71){(73) as
(62){(64) and (66).
Note that the EPC is modied as (57) since the equilibrium considered
here requires that only unemployed workers with n 2 [n; 1] choose to
preserve their employability. In this equilibrium, moreover, those who have
been unemployed for more than  n periods will be never rehired, regardless
of their employability. They have no choice but to live by consuming their
endowments in each period, which makes their lifetime utilities as low as
[(1 + r)=(r + )]w.
We can also state the following.
Lemma 6. Suppose that there is a stationary equilibrium with n < 0, and
let E, Un and UO denote, respectively, the populations of employed workers,
that of those who have been unemployed for  n (  n) periods, and that
of those who have been unemployed for more than  n periods. Further,
the job-nding rate for the jobless workers who are believed by rms to be
employable is a. Then, in this equilibrium, the values of E, Un, UO, and a
must satisfy
E =
af1  [(1  )(1  a)] n+1g
(1  )2ab[(1  )(1  a)] n + [1  (1  )(1  a  b)]N; (74)
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UO =
[(1  a) + b(1  )][1  (1  )(1  a)][(1  )(1  a)] n
(1  )2ab[(1  )(1  a)] n + [1  (1  )(1  a  b)] N; (75)
and for n = n;    ; 1,
Un =
[(1  a) + b(1  )][1  (1  )(1  a)][(1  )(1  a)] n 1
(1  )2ab[(1  )(1  a)] n + [1  (1  )(1  a  b)] N: (76)
Proof. When n < 0, the population measures E, Un, and UO satisfy the
following conditions:
(1  a)N + b(1  )E = U 1; (77)
8n = n+ 1;    ; 1; (1  )(1  a)Un = Un 1; (78)
(1  )(1  a)Un = UO; (79)
and
N = E +
 1X
n=n
Un + UO: (80)
Condition (77) is required by the fact that those who are currently experi-
encing their rst period of unemployment were either born in or working for
some rm in the previous period. Condition (78) is required by the fact that
those who are currently experiencing their  nth period of unemployment
were experiencing their ( n  1)th period of unemployment in the previous
period. Condition (79) is required by the fact that the population of those
who have been unemployed for more than  n periods is constant over time.
Condition (80) is required by the fact that any worker in the labor force
is either employed or unemployed. By solving (77){(80) with respect to E,
Un, and UO, we can obtain (74){(76).
Conditions (74){(76) are comparable to (37) in the case of n = 0, as
they keep the populations of employed and jobless workers constant in a
stationary equilibrium. Using Lemmas 5 and 6, we can show that the AICs
for n < 0 have a common vertical part.
Proposition 5. When a = 1, the AICs for n < 0 are identical and derived
as
E =
1
1 + b  bN ( E
); w^  w + 1 + r + (1  )b
(1  )(1  b)q e ( w
): (81)
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Proof. When a = 1, conditions (74){(76) are reduced to
E = [1=(1 + b  b)]N; (82)
U 1 = [(1  )b=(1 + b  b)]N; (83)
U 2 =    = Un = UO = 0: (84)
Moreover, conditions (62){(64) and (66) are reduced to
V  1U = w   e+
1  
1 + r
V 1E ; (85)
V 1E = w
1   e+ 1  
1 + r

(1  b)VE + bV  1U

; (86)
VE = w
2+   e+ 1  
1 + r

(1  b)VE + bV  1U

: (87)
By solving (85){(87) with respect to V  1U , V
1
E , and VE , we can obtain
V  1U =

1 + r
r + 

1 + r   (1  )(1  b)
1 + r + (1  )b w +
1  
1 + r + (1  )bw^   e

: (88)
Proposition 1 implies that when a = 1, the following are true:
w^  w2+
=
r + 
1 + r
V  1U +
1 + r   (1  )(1  b)(1  q)
(1  )(1  b)q e
=
1 + r   (1  )(1  b)
1 + r + (1  )b w +
1  
1 + r + (1  )bw^
+
1 + r   (1  )(1  b)
(1  )(1  b)q e;
the last equality of which is obtained from (88). By rearranging it, we can
obtain
w^  w + 1 + r + (1  )b
(1  )(1  b)q e = w
: (89)
Clearly, (82) and (89) are our desired results.
This result is not surprising. When a = 1, the labor market is so tight
that every job seeker can nd a job with one period of unemployment expe-
rience, and thus, the beliefs satisfying n < 0 have no eect on labor market
performance. In other words, if the dierences among such beliefs aect
labor market performance, the job nding rate must satisfy a < 1.
When n 2 (+1; 0), however, it is dicult to analytically derive the
AICs for the case of a < 1. Hence, we will derive the AICs for n 2 ( 1; 0),
resorting to the following numerical method. First, we will increase the
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value of a from 0 to 1 in steps of 0.001 and, for each value of a, compute
the values of VO, V
n
DU , V
1
DE , VDE , V
n
U , V
1
E , VE , w^, E, Un, and UO satisfying
(58){(76) and
w1 = w2+ = w^ =
r + 
1 + r
V  1U +
1 + r   (1  )(1  b)(1  q)
(1  )(1  b)q e:
The last condition is the rm's optimal wage-setting policy, that is, (2).
Since a < 1, we can assume that w1 = w2+ = w^. In computing these values,
we take one period as one year, and we congure the values of r, , , b, w,
e, q, and N as in Table 1. Combined with these parameter values, a given
value of a uniquely determines a set of the values of VO, V
n
DU , V
1
DE , VDE ,
V nU , V
1
E , VE , w^, E, Un, and UO. Thus, this process yields 1,001 sets of these
values. For each of the obtained sets, we will examine whether it satises
the EPC,
8n = n;    ; 1; V nU  V nDU :
If a set satises the EPC, it will be kept. Otherwise, it will be abandoned.
In doing so, we eectively pick up pairs of E and w^ that can constitute an
AIC. By depicting the locus of such pairs of E and w^ on the (E; w^) plane,
we obtain Figures 2 and 3.
Appendix C: Derivation of NSCE and SCEs (Not
for Publication)
As shown in Appendix B, the NSCE is always derived analytically. More-
over, when w^  w, the SCE is also derived analytically. Thus, in these
cases, all we have to do to derive the SCE and NSCE is substitute param-
eter values into the closed form of E, UO, a, E=L
, w1, and w2+. When
w^ < w, we x the value of n and then compare the values of w^, which
are obtained in deriving the proles of the AICs, with w, choosing the one
nearest to w. We regard the value of a that gives this nearest value of w
as the equilibrium value of a. Once the equilibrium value of a is obtained,
it gives the equilibrium values of E, UO, and E=L
, as in Appendix B.
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Appendix D: Alternative Interpretations of Work-
ers' and Investors' Surpluses (Not for Publication)
Workers' Surplus
We can show that the WS equals the discounted sum of the lifetime utilities
of the workers constituting the labor force in the present and future periods,
WS = E[( + b  b)V 1E + (1  )(1  b)VE ] +
 1X
n=n
UnV
n
U + UOVO
+
N
1  
1X
t=0
V (0; 1)
(1 + r)t
;
(90)
where V (0; 1) is the lifetime utility of newly born workers and V 1E , VE , V
n
U ,
VO, E, Un, and UO are dened as in Appendix B.
Proposition 6. The RHS of (90) can be expressed as
RHS =
1X
t=0

1
1 + r
t
[ ~wE + w(N   E)  e(N   UO)] ; (91)
where
~w  w1   (1  )(1  b)(w1   w2+): (92)
Proof. Since VO, V
n
U , V
1
E , VE , E, UO and Un satisfy (58),(62){(64) and (66),
and since V (0; 1) is given by
V (0; 1) =
1  
1 + r
[aV 1E + (1  a)V  1U ];
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(90) can be rewritten as
RHS = E[( + b  b)V 1E + (1  )(1  b)VE ] +
 1X
n=n
UnV
n
U + UOVO
+
N
1  
1X
t=0
V (0; 1)
(1 + r)t
;
= ( + b  b)E

w1   e+ 1  
1 + r
[(1  b)VE + bV  1U ]

+(1  )(1  b)E

w2+   e+ 1  
1 + r
[(1  b)VE + bV  1U ]

+Un

w   e+ 1  
1 + r
[aV 1E + (1  a)VO]

+
 1X
n=n+1
Un

w   e+ 1  
1 + r
[aV 1E + (1  a)V n 1U ]

+UO

w +
1  
1 + r
VO

+
N
1 + r
[aV 1E + (1  a)V  1U ]
+
N
1  
1X
t=1
V (0; 1)
(1 + r)t
:
Using ~w to rearrange the above equation, we can obtain
RHS = ~wE + w(N   E)  e(N   UO) + (1 + r) 1

8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
a
h
(1  )P 1n=n Un + NiV 1E
+(1  )(1  b)EVE
+ [(1  )bE + (1  a)N ]V  1U
+
P 2
n=n(1  )(1  a)Un+1V nU
+ [(1  )(1  a)Un + (1  )UO]VO
+[N=(1  )]P1t=0 V (0; 1)=(1 + r)t
9>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>;
= ~wE + w(N   E)  e(N   UO) + (1 + r) 1

8<:
E[( + b  b)V 1E + (1  )(1  b)VE ]
+
P 1
n=n UnV
n
U + UOVO
+[N=(1  )]P1t=0 V (0; 1)=(1 + r)t
9=;
= ~wE + w(N   E)  e(N   UO) + (1 + r) 1RHS;
the second equality of which is obtained from (77){(80). The obtained result
implies that WS must satisfy
WS =
1 + r
r
[ ~wE + w(N   E)  e(N   UO)] ;
which is equivalent to (91).
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Investors' Surplus
We can also show that the IS equals the discounted sum of investors' ex-
pected gains from past, current, and future investments,
IS =
1X
t=0

1
1 + r
t
 bE
L


 F + (L
)   wL
r + b

+
E
L
[(L)   ~wL]
+
1X
t=1

1  b
1 + r
t
 E
L

(L)   [w1 + (1  )w2+]L	 ; (93)
where w, L, and ~w are dened by (4) and (92). The rst term on the
RHS of (93) is the expected sum of net gains from establishing new rms
in and after the current period. As already seen in the proof of Lemma 2,
this term equals zero under free entry. The second and third terms are the
expected sum of the prots that currently operating rms will distribute to
their investors in future periods.
Proposition 7. The RHS of (93) can be expressed as
RHS =
1X
t=0

1
1 + r
t
 E
L
 [(L)   ~wL   bF ]: (94)
Proof. The second and third terms on the RHS of (93) can be reduced to
1 + r
r + b
 E
L
 [(L)   ~wL + b(w1   w)L] ( X):
Since the rst term equals zero, we can safely say that X gives the value of
the RHS. Note that
0 = b

 F + (L
)   wL
r + b

= (L)   ~wL   bF +  r[(L
)   ~wL] + b( ~w   w)L
r + b
= (L)   ~wL   bF   r[(L
)   ~wL + b(w1   w)L]
r + b
= (L)   ~wL   bF   r
1 + r
 L

E
X;
the third equality of which is obtained from the fact that
~w   w = ~w   w^
=  [r=(1 + r)](1  )(1  b)(w1   w2+)
=  r(w1   w^)
=  r(w1   w);
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where w^ is as dened in (3). The obtained result implies that the RHS must
satisfy
RHS =
1 + r
r
 E
L
 [(L)   ~wL   bF ];
which is equivalent to (94).
Appendix E: Computation of Tables 13{15 (Not for
Publication)
Let w(F ) be a reduced level of w, at which the prole of the aggregate labor
demand runs through the upper end of the upward-sloping parts of the AICs
for n < 0, given the value of F . When w is reduced to w(F ), the following
must be true:
w = w = w(F ) +
1 + r + (1  )b
(1  )(1  b)q e;
which can be rearranged as
w(F ) = w   1 + r + (1  )b
(1  )(1  b)q e
=

(1  )1 
(r + b)1 F 1 
1=
  1 + r + (1  )b
(1  )(1  b)q e;
(95)
the last line of which is obtained from (4). By substituting thirteen values
of F from 0.840 to 2 and other parameter values congured as in Table 1
into (95), we obtain the second column of Tables 13{15.
The reduction in w newly produces one NSCE and one SCE. In both
equilibrium, WS, IS, and TS can be expressed as
WS =

1 + r
r

[ ~wE + w(F )(N   E)  e(N   UO)] ; (96)
IS =

1 + r
r

 E
L
 [(L)   ~wL   bF ]; (97)
TS =

1 + r
r

E(L) 1 + w(F )(N   E)  bFE
L
  e(N   UO)

;(98)
where L = [(r + b)F=(1  )]1=. Thus, to evaluate WS, IS, and TS in the
new NSCE or the new SCE, we need to compute the values of E, UO, and
~w for each value of F at respective equilibria.
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In the new NSCE, E, UO, w
2+, w1, and ~w are determined as
E = E =

( + b  b)N; (99)
UO = N   E; (100)
w2+ = w(F ) +
1 + r   (1  )(1  b)(1  q)
(1  )(1  b)q e; (101)
w1 =
(1 + r)w   (1  b)(1  )w2+
1 + r   (1  b)(1  ) ; (102)
~w = w1   (1  )(1  b)(w1   w2+): (103)
By substituting the thirteen values of F and other parameter values into
(99){(103), we compute the equilibrium values of E, UO, w
2+, w1, and ~w
for each value of F . Then, substituting the equilibrium values of E, UO,
and ~w and other parameter values into (96){(98), we evaluate the values
of WS, IS, and TS in the NSCE for each value of F . Finally, taking the
dierences between the values of WS (resp. IS, TS) in the new NSCE and
their counterparts in the old one, which are reported in the second column
of Table 10 (resp. Table 11, Table 12), we obtain the third column of Table
13 (resp. Table 14, Table 15).
In the new SCE, E, UO, w
2+, w1, and ~w are determined as
E = E =
1
(1 + b  b)N; (104)
UO = 0; (105)
w2+ = w1 = ~w = w: (106)
By substituting the thirteen values of F and other parameter values into
(104){(106), we compute the equilibrium values of E, UO, w
2+, w1, and ~w
for each value of F . Then, substituting the equilibrium values of E, UO,
and ~w and other parameter values into (96){(98), we evaluate the values
of WS, IS, and TS in the new SCE for each value of F . Finally, taking
the dierences between the values of WS (resp. IS, TS) in the new SCE
and their counterparts in the current equilibrium, which are reported in the
second to eleventh columns of Table 10 (resp. Table 11, Table 12), we obtain
the fourth to thirteenth columns of Table 13 (resp. Table 14, Table 15).
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